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In Poland World War I Ended in 1923 
Kazimierz Robak 
ABSTRACT 
 
Poland was erased from European political maps in 1795 and fought in vain for 
freedom for the next century, until World War I provided another chance for 
independence. On November 11, 1918, the creation of the Polish Republic was 
proclaimed, but in an atmosphere of uncertainty, particularly relative to frontiers. 
The border with Germany was established in 1920-21 after plebiscites. While 
peaceful in Masuria, Ermland and Pomerania, there were three violent uprisings of the 
ethnic Poles in Upper Silesia. The status of Gdansk as a Free City was confirmed at 
Versailles in 1919. The Southern border with Czechoslovakia was settled in 1920.  
The Eastern borders were established after a war with Ukraine and a conflict with 
Lithuania. The last and most exhausting war with Soviet Russia was ended by 1921’s Riga 
Peace Treaty. Poland’s boundaries were finally recognized by the Conference of 
Ambassadors in March 1923. 
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Introduction 
 
 World War I rearranged the borders of Europe. Restoring the independence of Poland 
was postulated in Woodrow Wilson’s Fourteen Points, planned during the Paris Peace 
Conference and declared by the Treaty of Versailles on June 28, 1919. In Warsaw, the 
Regency Council proclaimed independence on October 7, 1918, but Poland doesn’t 
celebrate its Independence Day until November 11, to commemorate the nomination of 
Józef Piłsudski as the Commander-in-Chief of the Polish Army by the 1918 Regency 
Council (coincidentally, on the same day as the signing of the armistice in Compiegne).  
 November 11, 1918, with its symbolic meaning is a perfect date for the official 
celebrations and textbooks. The date of the proclamation of independence, however, usually 
indicates only the beginning of the last stage of the creation of Poland. To commence its own 
existence, a newborn state needs external peace and international recognition, so logically a 
second date should be taken into consideration. The date which closed the process of the 
formation of Poland was March 15, 1923, when the Conference of Ambassadors finally 
recognized the last border of Poland. 
 In November 1918 peace in Poland was distant and uncertain. As the borders of the 
new republic were not defined, its existence was unstable and fragile. In practice, 
establishing borders meant military struggle in which Poland, placed between two hostile 
powers, could lose her independence again. Both neighbor states, Germany and Soviet 
Russia, were openly hostile toward the reestablishment of the Polish state, arguing that 
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this was imposed by the Allies at the territorial expense of both collapsed empires as part 
of post-war revenge. 
 Despite Germany’s bitter resentment against the freshly signed treaty, the country 
was controlled by the Allies and had to fulfill the requirements of the Treaty of 
Versailles, at least in the beginning. Soviet Russia, to the contrary, could disregard any 
international opinion as she was excluded from the debates in Paris and Versailles.  
 For Poland, the struggle over borders with Germany was of less importance than 
the war with Soviet Russia. In the plebiscites Poland could only lose some land but the 
confrontation with Soviet Russia became a matter of life and death: defeat could mean 
incorporation into the Soviet empire. Both conflicts, however, caused a constant state of 
war. Only a few weeks after the victorious peace treaty with the Soviets was signed in 
1921, the third Upper Silesian uprising commenced – the most bloody and violent of 
conflicts in this region. Not until the last Polish border was recognized by the Conference 
of Ambassadors in 1923 could the independent life of the reestablished state begin.  
 I intend to examine primary and secondary sources to support the hypothesis that 
the statement “Poland was created in 1918” oversimplifies the entire complexity of the 
matter. The birth, and even the recreation of a state, does not happen immediately. A 
single date is understandable because of the need for symbols and precise facts. 
Historically, however, this is imprecise. On the basis of available sources a picture of the 
creation and rebuilding of the state not as a single act, but as a long-term and strenuous 
process will be presented. 
 Part One sketches the brief historical background and events in Poland after 1918. 
The most clear and simple method of organization is chronology. Chapter One presents 
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the demise of the political existence by the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth in the 
eighteenth century. Chapter Two briefly explains Poland’s attempts at regaining 
independence during the nineteenth century, focusing on the shift of the main efforts 
from strict military operations to political and ideological activities. Chapter Three 
delineates the intensification of political endeavors in the beginning of the twentieth 
century. Chapter Four describes the Great War from the point of view of Polish politicians 
and leaders. The collapse of Russia, Germany and Austria-Hungary by 1918 gave Poland 
the real chance for independence. The Paris Peace Conference provided the legal base to 
obtain it. 
Part Two discusses Poland’s struggle to establish her borders between 1918 and 
1923. The chapters successively examine the East, West, North, and South frontiers with 
Soviet Russia, Ukraine, Germany, Czechoslovakia and Romania, respectively. The 
efforts and the uncertainty of results are described. 
 Summarizing: if independent Poland was created with the end of the World War I 
then World War I in Poland ended in 1923.  
 Establishing borders by military struggle practically always brings long-range 
repercussions. The first effects on Poland came with the beginning of World War II, 
others can be perceived even today. By denoting these consequences, the complications 
involved in the issues of balance and international stability and the persistence of 
resentments kept in the collective memory of the nations is emphasized. 
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Part One 
The Historical Background 
 
1.1. The Eighteenth Century – The Downfall 
The Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth was formally a federation of the Kingdom 
of Poland and the Grand Duchy of Lithuania. Established in 1569, it was one of the most 
democratic and tolerant states of its time. The prime example of its standards is the Bill 
of 1573, known as the Warsaw Confederation, which guaranteed absolute religious 
freedom to all citizens and protected the Commonwealth from religious wars1. 
Nevertheless, the federation was not able to develop an effective safety mechanism which 
would preserve the state in case of corruption or activities contrary to the common 
interest. With the beginning of the eighteenth century the process of disintegration and 
foreign influence developed rapidly. Thus, the carving up of Poland by the three 
neighboring states – Russia, Prussia and Austria – was inevitable.  
The first partition occurred in 1772 – Russia, Prussia and Austria took circa 
twenty-eight percent of the Commonwealth. The second stage, agreed between Russia 
and Prussia in 1793, left the Polish-Lithuanian state with one third of its original territory. 
The third and final partition was signed by Russia, Prussia and Austria on October 24, 
1795.2 All three partitions occurred after Russian units broke the military resistance of 
patriotic forces. Austria and Prussia presented no opposition. Two partitions were 
                                                 
1 Wilczek, Piotr. “Catholics and Heretics. Some Aspects of Religious Debates in the Old Polish-Lithuanian 
Commonwealth,” The Sarmatian Review, vol. XIX, no. 2, April 1999, p.626 
2 Lukowski, Jerzy. The partitions of Poland: 1772, 1793, 1795. Longman, London/New York, 1999. 
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formally accepted by the corrupt Commonwealth’s parliament. “There was no Polish 
authority with whom the Third Partition might have been negotiated. In any case there 
was no point in seeking Polish approval for an act which was to abolish the Polish state 
completely.”3 
The Commonwealth ceased to exist as an independent state for 123 years. Poland 
and Lithuania regained independence as a result of the changes in political geography 
after World War I. 
 
1.2. The Nineteenth Century – The Age of Uprisings 
For Polish territories the nineteenth century was a period of constant struggle 
against the occupying powers. Polish units provided strong support to the Napoleonic 
army. Poles made up one quarter of the Grande Armée of 600,000 men which crossed the 
Russian border in June 1812. The tiny Duchy of Warsaw (Polish: Księstwo 
Warszawskie), established by Napoleon in 1807 as a rump state with 4.3 million 
inhabitants, raised an army of 100,000 men.4  
The November Insurrection of 1830-31, activating an army of 60,000, 
unsuccessfully tried to liberate territories occupied by the Russians. Engaging Russian 
forces saved the revolutions in Western Europe5, but instigated the tsar’s revenge and 
consequent repressions of Poland causing a large wave of emigration.6  
                                                 
3 Davies, Norman. God’s Playground. A History of Poland. v. I. The Origins to 1795, Columbia University 
Press, New York, 1982, p. 541. 
4 Wandycz, Piotr Stefan. The Price of Freedom: A History of East Central Europe From the Middle Ages to 
the Present (eBook). Taylor & Francis, London, New York, 2001, p. 151. 
5 One of the reasons of the November Insurrection outbreak was Tsar Nicholas I declaration that the 
Russian army, strengthened by Polish units, would assist the Dutch king against the revolt in Belgium. 
6 Wandycz. The Price, p. 152. 
6 
The later Cracow insurrection of 1846 was both brief and unsuccessful, but 
provided the Austrian and Russian forces a pretext to liquidate the free city status held by 
Cracow and to incorporate the town into Austria.7 The insurrection of 1846 in the Grand 
Duchy of Posen (Polish: Poznań), assigned to Prussia by the Congress of Vienna, took 
the same course and had the same result as Cracow.  
The peasant rebellion of 1846 in Galicia8 was, on the one hand, the aftermath of 
the Cracow uprising and a provocation from the Austrian secret police on the other. 
Polish peasants, deceived by Austrian agents, burned or destroyed more than 500 manors 
between Cracow and Tarnow and killed more than 200 landowners and 1000 local 
gentry. This was a heavy loss for the economy and cultural life of the region. The 
Austrian army delayed intervention, as long as the peasants attacked the main target: the 
Polish gentry. The rebellion was crushed by Austrian forces within a few days after the 
devastation of Polish properties.  
The Springtime of Nations (1848-49) caused insurrections in Polish territories 
under Austrian and Prussian domination. Numerous Polish volunteers also participated in 
the German and Austrian revolutions and in the Hungarian war for independence. This 
resulted in severe repression from the occupiers.  
                                                 
7 Davies. God’s Playground. v. II. pp. 334-339. 
8 Galicia, the province between Poland and Ukraine, has nothing in common with the region of Spain, and the 
homonymy is accidental. The Polish province was named after one of its towns, Halicz, pronounced in German as 
“Galitz”. Lodomeria derived from the Latinized name of the town of Włodzimierz (Vladimir). The medieval 
neighboring Principalities of Halicz and Vladimir lost their separate identity as the part of the Commonwealth. 
Austrians, to legitimize the first partition of Poland, claimed that they incorporated the Kingdom of Galicia and 
Lodomeria, in fact existing only in the Middle Ages as a part of Hungary. 
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The Great-Polish (Polish: Wielkopolska9) Insurrection of 1848 against the 
Prussian authorities brought bloody clashes between Polish and German inhabitants of 
the region. This caused repressive Prussian politics toward the Polish minority. 
The ill prepared January Insurrection against Russia (1863-64) was quelled by 
ruthless Russian military action and brought Russian revenge. It caused material, 
economic and human loses on an unprecedented scale.10  
The centenarian period after the Congress of Vienna in the states of Western 
Europe was characterized by accumulating capital, building strong economies, 
consolidating and centralizing previously dispersed territories, increasing military power, 
and expanding colonies. These were the decisive factors of the rapid and extensive 
European progress and development. Until the mid 1860s Polish territories were 
impoverished by constant wars, pacification and requisition actions, devastations and 
plundering as well as by economic, politic and national repression. The economy was 
weak, as a result of the multiple military defeats. Most of the upper classes were 
decimated, and those who survived were severely persecuted.  
The disastrous January 1863 Insurrection was the last Polish military effort in the 
nineteenth century. The economic collapse, mass executions, confiscations of estates, 
deportations and severe Russianization program became an everyday reality, as civil law 
was suspended in favor of martial law. In the territory occupied by Russia, the national 
disaster caused by the January uprising practically made any military struggle impossible. 
                                                 
9 Great-Poland (also Greater Poland; Polish: Wielkopolska, German: Grosspolen, Latin: Polonia Maior) –  
Polish historical region located in western-central Poland. Great-Poland was the core of the early medieval 
Polish state, often called the cradle of Poland. Major cities and towns: Poznań, Kalisz, Konin, Gniezno. The 
name of the region can be understood as Old Poland as opposed to New Poland (Lesser Poland, Polish: 
Małopolska, a region in south-eastern Poland with Cracow as its capital). 
10 Wandycz, Piotr Stefan. The lands of partitioned Poland, 1795-1918, Part II – The Age of Insurrections. 
University of Washington Press, Seattle, 1974, pp. 105-192. 
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The idea of armed insurrection was gradually abandoned in favor of building economic 
power. The abolishment of serfdom accelerated an industrialization process.  
The freedom fighters, conservative landowners and middle class nobles were 
dominated by the new generation of political activists. They realized that the center of 
gravity for a future independence could no longer be idealistic dreams of freedom and 
romantic solitary fighting. Only a modern industrialized society with strong political and 
military alliances could establish the independent state and gain international recognition. 
  
1.3. The Twentieth Century – The Age of Revolution  
The twentieth century for Poland was marked by a new factor: social revolts in 
the cities. The increasing number of workers initiated several political parties and social 
movements. Thus the fight for national freedom became inseparably connected with 
social demands. The most violent movements erupted in 1905-07, in the wake of the 
Russian defeat in the Russo-Japanese war and resultant revolution in Russia. In Poland 
the most important outcome of this unsuccessful uprising was the participation of the 
entire nation: workers and clerks, students and teachers, peasants and intelligentsia.  
This led to the division of Polish society into large factions: opponents and 
supporters of socialism, those content with autonomy and those who believed in fighting 
for independence. The socialists were led by the Polish Socialist Party (Polish: Polska 
Partia Socjalistyczna, PPS) established in 1892, and its leader Józef Piłsudski. The 
nationalists of the National Democratic Party (Polish: Narodowa Demokracja, ND), 
established under this name in 1897 but active since 1887, were led by Roman Dmowski. 
The third important political organization, the Polish Peasant Party (Polish: Polskie 
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Stronnictwo Ludowe, PSL) was formed in Galicia, but its influence was not significant, 
as most peasants supported Piłsudski and the PPS. 
The Polish socialists soon split. The first branch still known as PPS and led by 
Piłsudski decided for a military struggle for an independent state. In 1910, the PPS 
approved the creation of the paramilitary Riflemen Association (Polish: Związek 
Strzelecki). The association was legal in Austria-Hungary and clandestine in Russia and 
Germany. The Riflemen later became the core of the World War I Polish Legions 
(Polish: Legiony Polskie). The legions were created in Austria-Hungary after the 
beginning of the war when Piłsudski, always treating Russia as Poland’s most dangerous 
enemy, officially proclaimed the PPS’s support for the Central Powers.  
The other socialist branch adopted a Marxist and internationalist program. It 
claimed that independence could only be reached by an anti-tsarist revolution led by the 
Russian proletariat. They later became the Communist Party of Poland (Polish: 
Komunistyczna Partia Polski, KPP), which, after the Bolshevik revolution, became an 
instrument of Soviet intelligence and was banned in independent Poland in 1919. 
Polish nationalists connected the future of Polish independence with tsarist 
Russia. They tried to obtain it legally, first by gaining autonomy within the Russian 
Empire. They abandoned anti-tsarist activities and began collaboration, for example 
entering the Russian state assembly – the Duma. Their program included pan-Slavism, 
the concept of the unification of all Slavic nations under Russian domination, and open 
hostility toward Jews and the Germans. Dmowski didn’t alter his policy even when the 
tsar began to revoke the minimal concessions granted to the Poles after the 1905-07 
events. This decreased the number of the ND’s supporters, who now would rather support 
10 
Piłsudski’s side. They created legal semi-military organizations in Galicia – Polish 
Riflemen Squads (Polish: Polskie Drużyny Strzeleckie), later co-participants in the Polish 
Legions. 
 
1.4 The Great War. 
In World War I approximately 3.5 million Poles were drafted to fight for both 
sides. They were mostly organized into separate units, but many Poles were incorporated 
into regular armies, often fighting – or refusing to fight – against themselves, mostly on 
the Eastern front. 
Immediately after the assassination in Sarajevo, on the Russian occupied 
territories, Piłsudski established the covert Polish Military Organization (Polish: Polska 
Organizacja Wojskowa, POW) as a part of the Austro-Hungarian army. He also informed 
Austro-Hungarian authorities in Cracow that a National Government of Poland was 
created in Warsaw with him as the Commander-in-Chief of the future Polish army. This 
information and documentation was falsified. Nevertheless, before Austro-Hungarian 
intelligence could verify it, Piłsudski with his units formed in Galicia crossed the Russian 
border on August 6, 1914, entering Kielce, to fight for Polish independence. His action, 
however, did not initiate an insurrection. It received no support from Austria-Hungary 
who distrusted Piłsudski. Polish units, however, were not dispersed and two additional 
Polish Legions were established in 1914 as support units for the regular Austro-
Hungarian army. They were commanded by Polish officers from the Austro-Hungarian 
army and consisted of three brigades. Piłsudski, deprived of its overall command, was in 
charge of the First Brigade, but staff and soldiers considered him the moral leader of the 
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Legions. Thanks to his efforts, the Polish units maintained their national character and 
autonomy. The Legions fought on the Eastern front and both Austro-Hungarian and 
German staffs valued them as reliable and outstanding units. 
On November 5, 1916, the German and Austro-Hungarian Emperors proclaimed 
the Two Emperors’ Manifesto, announcing the near creation of an independent Polish 
Kingdom. The day before, Emperor Franz Josef I of Austria-Hungary declared that the 
Polish-inhabited territories of Austria-Hungary would soon be granted autonomy within 
the Habsburg Empire. These proclamations were received with envy by other Habsburg 
minorities, especially by the Czechs. “It was therefore likely that Vienna and Berlin 
would settle on the ‘Austria solution’ for Poland – the merging of Russian Poland and 
Galicia and the creation of a trialistic Austro-Hungarian-Polish state.”11 
From the Polish viewpoint things were not so optimistic. Part of the Polish Legions 
were incorporated into the army of the new state as the Polish Military Force (German: 
Polnische Wehrmacht), which never reached more than 5,000 men. Piłsudski and most of 
his officers and soldiers refused to take an oath of loyalty to either of the Emperors, Franz 
Josef and Wilhelm II. Piłsudski was imprisoned in the Magdeburg castle in Germany, some 
soldiers were interned, and others incorporated into Austro-Hungarian units.  
The tsarist regime was aware of the strong anti-Russian attitudes among 
oppressed nations and evaluated the issue of national army units very carefully. The 
Russian army drafted millions from the occupied Polish lands, but established only a 
few strictly Polish units. The Pulawy Legion (Polish: Legion Puławski) which was 
                                                 
11 Rees, H. Louis. The Czechs During World War I. The Path to Independence. Columbia University Press, 
New York 1992, p. 24. 
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formed in 1914 at the initiative of the Polish nationalist party, never had more than a 
thousand men.  
In the meantime, the leader of the nationalists, Roman Dmowski, altered his 
program. A visit to Petrograd and subsequent meetings with state authorities convinced 
him that as far as the Polish issue was concerned, the Russians would oppose any change 
and concession. At the end of 1915 Dmowski left Russia for Paris, where he tried to 
convince the British and French governments of the strategic importance of an 
independent Poland.  
Polish units were created within French military forces only in 1917, by decree of 
President Poincaré. The Polish Army in France, known as the Blue Army because of the 
color of its uniforms, had some 100,000 men divided into six infantry divisions. The 
army was recruited from Polish immigrants living in France and Belgium, Polish POWs 
from the German and Austro-Hungarian armies, and Polish soldiers from the Russian 
army.  
The significant part of the French Polish Army was the Polish-American Army – 
a unit created in Ontario, Canada in 1917 by about 25,000 Polish-American volunteers 
helping the Entente. In Europe, the Polish-Americans fought in the last campaigns on the 
Western front. Then, with other units of Blue Army, they participated in the Polish-Soviet 
war of 1919-1921 and later returned to America.12 
The Polish freedom activists greeted World War I as the chance to obtain 
independence. All sides recognized it, so Russian, German and Austro-Hungarian 
policies toward the Poles assumed basically the same pattern. In 1914, Prince Nicholas 
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Nikolayevich, the Commander-in-Chief of the Russian Army, addressed a proclamation 
to the Poles, full of hazy and vague promises of unification under the tsar’s scepter. 
Similar proclamations were issued by other armies. In the meantime, the three competing 
armies plundered Polish territories, bombarded Polish towns, and drafted recruits. 
Tsar Nicholas II’s answer to the Central Powers’ November 5 proclamation came 
on December 25: he declared Poland’s freedom in confederation with Russia. The 
declaration was influenced by his Western allies: the Entente did not want the Kingdom of 
Poland unified with Germany because it would militarily strengthen the German Empire. 
With the revolution in Russia during March 1917, the proclamation of the Polish 
right for independence was announced in Petrograd but again in words only. On 
November 15, 1917, the Bolsheviks issued the Declaration of the Nations of Russia, 
confirming their right to self-determination until they regained full sovereignty and 
formed independent states. This act, forced by circumstances, was totally inconsistent 
with the official Bolshevik program of world revolution, abolishing all states and national 
frontiers. This was soon confirmed: Leon Trotsky opposed the presence of the Polish 
delegation at the Brest-Litovsk treaty negotiations, and Soviet Russia did not recognize 
the independence of the Ukraine proclaimed in 1918. 
On January 5, 1918, British Prime Minister David Lloyd George admitted the 
necessity of creating an independent Poland. Three days later, United States President 
Woodrow Wilson delivered his Fourteen Points in a joint session of Congress. Point 13 
stated: “An independent Polish state should be erected which should include the 
territories inhabited by indisputably Polish populations, which should be assured a free 
14 
and secure access to the sea, and whose political and economic independence and 
territorial integrity should be guaranteed by international covenant.”13 
The Central Powers, negotiating the 1918 Brest-Litovsk Treaty, demanded from 
Russia the exclusive rights to decide the future of Poland, the Ukraine, and Belarus14, the 
Baltic States, Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania and Finland as these states had to form the 
German zone in a Mitteleuropa plan (never established). Russia finally signed the treaty. This 
decision met with universal violent Polish reaction, because it appeared to create a fourth 
partition of Poland. Polish units in the Austro-Hungarian army mutinied: the major part of the 
Polish Auxiliary Corps left the front lines and withdrew to the independent Ukraine. Officers 
and soldiers were disarmed and some fled to France, as did General Józef Haller who became 
the commander of the Polish Blue Army. In the meantime Piłsudski, as stated, was interned 
by the Germans in Magdeburg. 
In Russia, the Bolsheviks and Polish communists openly opposed an independent 
Poland. Polish organizations were dissolved and many Poles arrested. In the meantime 
the Germans demanded Russian annulment of the eighteenth century partition treaties 
and the surrender of all Russian rights to Polish territories. Lenin, attempting to save the 
Bolshevik revolution at any price, issued the necessary decree on August 29, 1918 and 
his propaganda emphasized Russia’s peaceful intentions toward Poland without 
mentioning a word about the conditions set by the Central Powers. After the German 
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army’s withdrawal at the end of the World War, the Brest-Litovsk Treaty was nullified 
by the Soviets on November 13, 1918.  
In Warsaw, the Regency Council proclaimed the independence of Poland on 
October 7, 1918, and took control over the Polnische Wehrmacht. On November 10, 
Józef Piłsudski, released from Magdeburg, traveled to Warsaw. The next day the 
Regency Council nominated him to be the Commander-in-Chief of the Polish Army. On 
November 14, the Council ceded full civil authority to Piłsudski and dissolved itself. 
Poland reappeared on the political map of Europe. 
16 
 
 
Part Two. 
Struggle for the Borders after the War 
 
2.1. In Paris 1919 
The Treaty of Versailles, which changed the political shape of Europe and the 
world, was based on a weak foundation. At the conference – for whatever reason – the 
delegates of the two most powerful European nations, Germany and Russia, were not 
present. It was not difficult to presume that the Paris resolutions signed in Versailles 
would apply only as long as the two absentees remained weak. 
There was also the danger of a rebirth of the Habsburg Empire in its Austrian and 
Hungarian editions. France was particularly distrustful of them, as this could undermine 
the paragraph of the peace treaty forbidding Austria to merge with Germany. That 
partially explains the creation of the Little Entente in 1920-1921 by Czechoslovakia, 
Romania and Yugoslavia, as a mutual defense arrangement with French support. “The 
members joined forces to block Hungarian attempts at territorial revision of the peace 
treaties of 1919-20 and to prevent the restoration of the Habsburg dynasty.”15 The French 
concern was short-lived: in 1938, when the Anschluss or incorporation of Austria into 
Greater Germany, France and Great Britain opted for an appeasement policy and the US 
a nonalignment policy.  
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Nevertheless, the Treaty of Versailles could only endure as long as Russia and 
Germany remained feeble. The 1815 Congress of Vienna established the status quo and 
relative European peace for one hundred years. Austrian Foreign Minister Prince Klemens 
von Metternich, by inviting French Foreign Minister Talleyrand to Vienna, was 
incomparably more farsighted than Georges Clemenceau, overwhelmed by the desire of 
revenge over Germany. To satisfy his future voters, David Lloyd George publicly shared 
the popular British clamor that ‘the German lemon should be squeezed until the pips 
squeak.’ To revive British trade and post-war economy he also thought of bringing 
Germany back into the European state system but he couldn’t openly oppose instructions 
from the Parliament to ‘present the bill in full to the Germans.’ Woodrow Wilson’s 
practical idealism (“we can receive what we demand only if we can do it without crushing 
Germany for thirty-five years”16) did not help either.  
The only thing which could stop a future war was the old European balance of 
power impossible without Germany, Russia and – in broader perspective – the USA. That 
is why the Versailles resolutions did not even last three years. The first breach was kept 
hidden: in 1922 Germany and Soviet Russia signed the Treaty of Rapallo, with a secret 
annex allowing Germany to produce weapons forbidden in the Versailles Treaty, and to 
train German military units in Russia. In 1935 the violations were uncovered: Hitler 
brought the Wehrmacht into being, and in 1936 started to remilitarize the Rhineland. 
But in 1919 the Allied Powers had dictated the peace conditions to Europe and the 
world. However, they cannot be blamed for not establishing Polish borders. In the Polish 
case it was possible only on the German and Czechoslovak frontiers, regarding these 
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territories as – at least theoretically – stable. The contested questions had to be settled 
through plebiscites, which was the usual peaceful way of resolving cases of this type. 
To establish the eastern Polish border in the Treaty of Versailles was impossible. 
Russia was convulsed by a civil war between the Bolsheviks and the supporters of the 
ancient regime. After the Great War not only Poland but also Lithuania, Belarus and 
Ukraine emerged as independent states and they did not have any officially accepted 
borders either. Both Russias - White and Red – fiercely opposed the independence of the 
former parts of the Russian Empire. In 1919 nobody could anticipate what kind of states 
and in what shape they would emerge from this chaos. The same situation, although on a 
lesser scale, occurred in Hungary, so the Allied Powers decided to wait until the political 
situation cleared up.17  
At the Paris Peace Conference, Poland was represented by Roman Dmowski, the 
leader of Polish nationalists now loyal to the West, and Ignacy Paderewski, the world 
famous pianist and composer, now Polish Prime and Foreign Minister.  
The Polish political parties remained adamant that the partitions of Poland were 
against international law. Thus, they demanded the restoration of the Polish-Lithuanian 
Commonwealth borders of 1772. Besides historical reasons there also existed economic 
and strategic ones as well: President Wilson used more than just ethnic grounds for 
forming a new Poland. He mentioned “a free and secure access to the sea,” and “political 
and economic independence.”18  
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These aspirations were not satisfied. One of the opponents to the Polish demands 
was British Prime Minister David Lloyd George. “There can be few countries in which 
Lloyd George was more heartily vilified than Poland” – wrote a British historian. 
Concerned about the continental balance of power he was trying to balance France and the 
Soviet Union and opted for the strengthening of Germany at Polish expense.  
His actions at the Peace Conference were deplored; his supposed 
opinions about the Poles being ‘children who gave trouble,’ his confession 
that he had never heard of Cieszyn, the lèse-majesté of his remarks about 
Paderewski, were widely reported in Poland, where, it is no exaggeration to 
say, Lloyd George was in 1919-20 usually regarded as a public enemy. A 
number of his advisers held the country in no high regard, and talk among 
British ministers on the subject of Poland was often antipathetic.19 
 
The justification for the British position can be found in Margaret MacMillan’s 
recent study of the Peace Conference: 
 The British […] feared, with some reason, that Poland could become a 
liability. Who would defend it if its neighbors, Germany and Russia in 
particular, attacked? Moreover the British did not particularly care for either 
Polish faction. Piłsudski had fought against them and was a dangerous 
radical. Dmowski and the Polish National Committee were too right-wing. 
‘In fact the prevailing opinion,’ said a British diplomat in Warsaw, ‘which 
to a great extent influenced me at the time seemed to be that to do anything 
the Polish Committee asked for would be to fasten upon Poland a regime of 
wicked landlords who spent most of their time in riotous living, and 
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establish there a Chauvinist Government whose object was to acquire 
territories inhabited by non-Polish populations.’20 
 
MacMillan also explained other Allies’ attitudes toward the Polish delegation and 
its demands: 
 The French, by contrast, were not only great supporters of Dmowski; they 
took a profound interest in Poland. […] French policy toward Poland was a 
mixture of the practical and the romantic. France no longer had Russia to 
counterbalance Germany, but strong Poland, allied perhaps to Czechoslovakia 
and Romania, could fill that role. […] The United States lay somewhere in 
between. […] Wilson gradually came around to supporting an independent 
Poland, but he was noncommittal on its borders. ‘I saw M. Dmowski and M. 
Paderewski in Washington,’ he told his fellow pacemakers in Paris, ‘and I asked 
them to define Poland for me, as they understood it, and they presented me with 
a map in which they claimed a large part of the earth.’21 
 
 Finally, of the various disputed territories only most of Great-Poland and Eastern 
Pomerania (the famous ‘corridor’) were incorporated into Poland. Other frontier areas 
with Germany had to be established after plebiscites were organized in Upper Silesia, 
Masuria (Polish: Mazury), Ermland (Polish: Warmia) and the district of Lower Vistula 
(Polish: Powiśle). Gdańsk became a Free City (German: Freiestadt Danzig, Polish: 
Wolne Miasto Gdańsk). The Polish-Czechoslovakian border (in a state of war since 
January 1919) and the eastern border with Soviet Russia were not settled. Article 87 of 
the Peace Treaty of Versailles stated: “The boundaries of Poland not laid down in the 
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present Treaty will be subsequently determined by the Principal Allied and Associated 
Powers.”22 
 
 2.2. Eastern Border 
  The situation on the eastern border of Poland was complicated. Ethnically the 
territories on the East were inhabited by Poles, Lithuanians, Belarusians and Ukrainians. 
Before the last partition in 1795, Poland and Lithuania were united in a common state: 
the Commonwealth, where Belarusians and Ukrainians were the ethnic minorities. 
 Before World War I the eastern territories of the late Commonwealth belonged to the 
Russian Empire and the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy. There, Poles and Lithuanians were 
ethnic minorities with Belarusians and Ukrainians.   
 Settling Poland’s borders in the east, where anarchists, Bolsheviks, 
White Russians, Ukrainians, Lithuanians, Latvians, Estonians and Baltic 
Germans were jostling for power was even more difficult. The peacemakers 
did not know how many countries they would be dealing with, or which 
governments. The Commission on Polish Affairs was instructed to go ahead 
anyway and duly worked out a border that brought all the clearly Polish 
territories into Poland. […] The Polish government did not have the slightest 
intention of accepting this. While the peacemakers had been busy with their 
maps, Polish forces had been equally busy on the ground.23 
 
2.2.1. The Eastern Border: Ukraine 
A brief outline of Ukrainian history is necessary here. It commenced from the mid 
seventeenth century, when the Cossacks, led by Bohdan Chmielnicki, started a civil war, 
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demanding equal rights in the Commonwealth, as the third party of the federation. In 
1654, Polish and Lithuanian nobility officially opposed the demands and Chmielnicki 
agreed to subordinate the Ukraine to Russia. Part of the Cossacks disagreed, preferring 
the Commonwealth even under unequal legal conditions. Finally, the Andruszów Peace 
Treaty of 1667 divided the Ukraine: the lands on the eastern bank of the Dnieper River 
with Kiev (later called the Left-bank or Eastern Ukraine) became Russian. The Right-
bank (Western) Ukraine stayed with the Commonwealth. 
After 1795, the Right-bank Ukraine was divided between Russia and Austria. In 
Russia, the Ukrainians were deprived of any form of autonomy. Russia supported 
Russophile movements in the Ukraine, consistently refused to grant Ukrainians any rights 
to national distinction and increased repression against Ukrainian activists. 
In Austria24 the Ukrainian issue was considered to be an internal Polish matter, 
nevertheless the Ukrainians in the Austrian (and later the Austro-Hungarian) Monarchy had 
far better conditions for cultural and national developments than those on the Russian side. 
In 1918-1920 from the historic Ukrainian territories (the Eastern and Western 
Ukraine, as in the seventeenth century) three Ukrainian states were created. In January 
1918, the Ukrainian People’s Republic was proclaimed in Kiev, spreading, more or less, 
over the former Left-bank Ukraine. On February 8, 1918, the Bolsheviks attacked the 
state, shortly seizing Kiev. Between 1918 and 1920 the Ukrainian capital remained 
mostly in Ukrainian hands. 
In October 1918, the Galician Ukrainians created the Western Ukrainian People's 
Republic with its capital in Lvov. In January 1919 this state merged with the Ukrainian 
People's Republic, but this proved of no practical importance, as Polish military forces 
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already occupied most of its territories. In April 1920 Poland signed a treaty with the 
Ukrainian People's Republic: after the incorporation of the Western Ukrainian People's 
Republic and the exchange for Galicia, Poland recognized the Ukrainian People's Republic 
and both states started a common war with Soviet Russia. Polish units entered Kiev in 
April 1920 and drove the Bolsheviks from the Ukrainian capital. 
In the meantime, on January 6, 1919, the Bolsheviks created the Ukrainian Soviet 
Socialist Republic, with its capital in Kharkov. This puppet state, totally subordinated to 
Moscow, was governed by the Bolsheviks, as were all later Soviet satellite states and 
republics. However, the Bolsheviks attempted to keep up the appearances of the Soviet 
Ukraine independence as they hoped to profit from it in the near future. 
The latter part of the chapter will detail the Polish-Ukrainian and Polish-Soviet 
wars. However, it should be noted that the 1921Peace Treaty of Riga, while ending the 
war with the Bolsheviks, shattered Ukrainian hopes for independence. Poland did not 
oppose that one of the negotiating parties was the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic. 
Officially, it was a recognition of the Soviet Ukraine as the sole representative of the 
Ukrainian people. Poland breached the treaty with the Ukrainian People's Republic and 
destroyed the chances for creating the independent, democratic Ukrainian state. The later 
excuse that it was done under Entente pressure is very weak. 
 
2.2.2 The Polish-Ukrainian war 
The vast territories east of the Bug River, from Latvia and Lithuania in the north 
to the Ukraine and Crimea in the south are called the Borderland (Polish: Kresy). The 
Bolsheviks wanted the Borderland because it was on the road to Europe where the 
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Marxist-Leninist revolution had to be ignited. Poland claimed the Borderland as a part of 
the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth in its historical frontiers before 1772. Polish 
nationalists opted for incorporation and their leader Dmowski openly rejected any special 
treatment for ethnic minorities.  Józef Piłsudski and the Polish Socialist Party advocated a 
democratic federation of the sovereign Borderland states freely allied against Russia. In 
1919, the nationalists held the majority in the Parliament, while Piłsudski, as 
Commander-in-Chief, controlled the army. 
The conflict on the Polish eastern border started before the capitulation of the 
Central Powers. On January 1, 1918, in the former Russian Ukraine, the Ukrainian 
People’s Republic was established with its capital in Kiev. On February 9, its government 
signed the Brest-Litovsk Treaty and the Central Powers agreed to attach the territories on 
the left bank of the Bug River to Ukraine. Although this portion of the Brest-Litovsk 
treaty never came into effect, Polish opinion was extremely hostile, treating the disputed 
area as distinctly Polish. 
On October 19, 1918, in the eastern part of Austrian Galicia, the Ukrainians 
proclaimed the independent Western Ukrainian People’s Republic. These territories were 
inhabited mostly by Ukrainians, Poles dominating only Lvov (German: Lemberg). As the 
largest town of the region and the previous capital of Galicia, Lvov became the capital of 
the Western Ukraine.25  
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Heavy fighting between Western Ukrainians and Poles started in Lvov. The struggle 
ended with the intervention of the Polish army on November 22, 1918. From the beginning 
of 1919, Polish forces fought on two Ukrainian fronts. In May Poland launched a massive 
offensive and defeated Western Ukrainian forces within two months. The Polish military 
success in Western Ukraine was achieved because Bolsheviks forces attacked the Ukraine 
from the north. The two Ukrainian states (the Ukrainian People’s Republic and Western 
Ukrainian People’s Republic) merged in January 1919, but their situation was desperate. 
After Poland incorporated Eastern Galicia into her fold, the Red Army entered Kiev.  
In the meantime, the Bolsheviks attacked Belarus and Lithuania incorporating them 
into Russia as Soviet Republics in January 1919.  
 From February 1919, fighting between the Bolsheviks and the Poles 
spread along a wide front. The Poles pushed deep into Russian territory, 
taking much of Byelorussia in the north. Secret talks for a temporary truce 
in the summer of 1919 went nowhere when the Poles tried to insist on an 
independent Ukraine.26  
 
The northern wing of the Polish army counterattacked and entered Vilna on April 21, 
1919. Piłsudski’s idea of a future federation between Poland and Lithuania was immediately 
rejected by the Lithuanians. The Paris Conference’s Supreme Council accepted the status quo 
of this region, deciding to draw the frontiers based on ethnicity, and left Vilna, with a Polish 
majority on the Polish side. 
The central group of the Polish army attacked the Bolsheviks in Belarus and entered 
its capital, Minsk. Thus Poland found herself at war with Russia on three fronts: Lithuania (in 
the northeast), Belarus (in the east) and the Ukraine (in the southeast).  
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 By the summer of 1919 Piłsudski halted the Polish offensive. To Piłsudski both 
Russian faces, White and Red, were dangerous to Poland. By defeating the Reds Piłsudski 
did not want to help the reestablishment of the Russian Empire, especially when one of the 
White commanders, General Denikin, openly rejected any possibility of creating an 
independent Poland in the future. Piłsudski also realized that White Russia would have much 
stronger Allied support at the cost of Poland. His harsh conclusion was not without reason.  
In October 1919 Paderewski sent [Churchill] a long list of Poland’s 
military requirements, but a meeting of the War Cabinet on October 16 
established the principle that ‘help for the Polish Army rested with the Allies 
generally and only to a very minor degree with Great Britain.’ A further 
meeting […] specified that the French ought to take main responsibility for 
arming Poland in view of British help for Denikin. […] Churchill’s attempts 
in this direction exposed his ignorance of East European affairs, for the 
chances of co-operation between Piłsudski and Denikin, who did not 
recognize the independence of Poland, were nil.27 
 
2.2.3 The Polish-Ukrainian Diplomacy and Cooperation 
In the spring of 1920, the Bolsheviks were winning the Civil War in Russia and 
started preparations to wipe out the creation of independent and democratic (“bourgeois” 
in the language of the Soviet propaganda) republics, Belarus and the Ukraine and to 
spread the revolution through Poland to Germany and the rest of Europe.  
Unlike all the other post-war squabbles with which it is frequently 
equated, the Polish-Soviet War raised wider issues – the clash of 
ideologies, the export of revolution, the future of Europe itself. For this 
reason, it aroused greater passions among contemporaries, and deserves 
the deeper curiosity of historians. […] The dramatic action of 1920 is part 
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of an unbroken sequence of events which began in obscurity at Bereza 
Kartuska in Byelorussia on 14 February 1919.28 
 
Within five months the Red Army had increased its armed forces from four to 
twenty divisions, however, the Bolshevik idea of world revolution was not based on a 
military conquest of Europe, which proved impossible in the Great War, the Germans 
defeated 150 tsarist divisions. The Red Army formed only thirty-six divisions. Lenin and 
Trotsky believed, however, that after the first victory of the Soviet forces the oppressed 
proletariat of the world would rise and start the final and victorious battle with capitalism 
and imperialism. Four month old Poland was to be the first and easiest victim.  
Both Soviet leaders, after the incorporation of Belarus and Ukraine into Russia, 
wished to turn Poland into a Soviet republic or a satellite state. 
 
At this time, Soviet Russia viewed Poland as a neighboring state 
whose territory should first experience the expanding revolution. […] The 
destruction of the Polish state was less an aim in itself than an important stage 
in the expected Red march into Europe, to the cradle of Marxism – Germany. 
This was expressed in the unambiguous, often cited phrase from Mikhail 
Tukhachevsky’s order of July 2, 1920, to the armies of the Soviet western 
front […]: ‘Over the dead body of White Poland lies the shining path to 
worldwide conflagration.’29 
 
In April 1920 in Warsaw, Piłsudski signed an alliance treaty with the Ukrainian 
military commander, Ataman Symon Petlura. Poland thus recognized an independent 
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Ukrainian People’s Republic. Petlura denounced any rights to Eastern Galicia, which in 
practice gave the lands of the former Western Ukrainian Republic to Poland. The 
Western Ukrainians considered this to be treason from both sides. For Petlura the alliance 
with Poland was the last chance of keeping at least part of his country independent. 
Meanwhile, Piłsudski considered a triple federation consisting of Poland, Lithuania, and 
Ukraine in an anti-Soviet Alliance. 
Polish and Ukrainian forces launched a joint offensive in the south on April 25, 
1920. Two weeks later, the Polish army entered Kiev where it remained until June 10.  
Marshal Józef Piłsudski, Poland’s head of state, recognized the 
historical unique opportunity to destroy the Russian empire and guarantee 
real self determination and independence for all the captive nations. For 
this reason the main goal of Polish foreign policy was not only to preserve 
Polish independence, but also to support the struggle for independence of 
its eastern neighbors. The Polish offensive into Ukraine in April 1920 was 
such an attempt. An Independent Ukraine could be the best buffer between 
Poland and Soviet Russia. Accusations regarding Poland’s imperial 
ambitions and desires to annex ‘Russian territories’ lack justification.30  
 
The Ukrainian issue became for Poland of secondary importance, as on June 10, 
1920, the Bolshevik counteroffensive commenced, which placed the existence of the entire 
Polish state in jeopardy. 
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2.3. Eastern Border: Soviet Russia and Soviet Propaganda 
The Soviet army, under General Mikhail Tukhachevsky, launched a rapid and 
effective attack forcing a Polish retreat. The Red Army recaptured its lost regions and 
pushed all the way to Warsaw. On Polish territories, once again under Russian occupation, 
the communists established revolutionary committees (Russian: Revkom), to be the core of 
future Soviet administration. The Committees ruled with terror and rapidly exterminated 
Polish inhabitants. “Their task was to found communist cells in each of the occupied 
villages, estates, and factories. […] It was directed by Russians, who assumed that Russian 
and Yiddish ought to be the official languages of revolutionary Poland. […] The revkoms 
attracted the most opportunist elements […].”31 
Long before Soviet Russia invaded Poland, the Central Executive Committee of 
the Communist International began laying the groundwork for an ideological offensive 
against Poland. The Bolsheviks attempted to discredit Poland in the eyes of the working 
classes of the world. Their propaganda charged that the Allies, especially France, 
determined to recoup her financial losses in Russia, and thus was using Poland as a pawn 
for implementing imperialistic designs in Eastern Europe and overthrowing the worker 
and peasant government of Soviet Russia. The workers of Poland and Europe were urged 
to resist war-like activities of their governments that aided Polish aggression.  
This campaign succeeded somewhat. The Polish communists who lived close to 
Russia were heavily influenced by Soviet indoctrination and intelligence. They supported 
the Bolshevik war against Poland and hoped the Red Army would enter Poland and 
complete the Communist revolution. “The position of the Polish Workers Communist Party 
on the Russo-Polish war, meaning the fact that since the beginning of the war the Party 
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opted for the Soviet side, raises constant emotions and brings much misunderstanding.”32 
The cited article was a typical mixture of Soviet indoctrination and local censorship. 
Although the author tries to explain her position using obviously false statements, she 
cannot deny the basic fact that in 1920 Polish communists supported the invader, which 
in Poland was commonly considered high treason.  
The workers in Berlin, stevedores in Danzig and railway men in Brno refused to 
load and unload shipments to delay supplies destined for Poland under the slogan “Hands 
off Russia.” In Britain this campaign started in February 1920. In August 1920 British 
Labour Party leaders threatened a political strike to prevent Britain from becoming 
involved in a war with Soviet Russia over Poland. The Labour Party’s action not only 
mobilized public opinion but later influenced the government to pressure the Poles to 
accept Russian peace terms. It was probably orchestrated, because it is hard to believe 
that the Labour Party leaders did not know that a direct British intervention in Eastern 
Europe was out of the question.  
French communists sympathized with the Bolsheviks as well. In August 1920, one 
of the prominent activists and the founder of the French Communist party, Marcel Cachin, 
returned from Russia. After meeting Cachin, the Polish diplomat Franciszek Sokal penned 
a note for the Polish Foreign Propaganda Bureau.  
[Cachin] spoke of the Soviet government with esteem. […] French 
left wing does not care about Poland. The confidence in the Soviet honesty 
and frankness is absolute, and there is no confidence in the Polish 
government. […] Cachin told me that the Polish army should be 
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destroyed. […] The French Socialist Party agreed with the English Labour 
Party on a joint anti-war action”33 
 
2.3.1. The Spa Meeting 
On December 8, 1919, the Allied Supreme Council in Paris designated the Polish 
eastern border on the Bug River. Named the Curzon Line, after the British Foreign 
Minister, it was unfavorable to Poland and favorable to Russia34. Poland was officially 
informed of this decision in July 1920 in Spa, where the Polish delegation applied for 
assistance in an extremely difficult moment for the entire nation and state. With the 
Bolshevik army ante portas, on July 10, 1920, the Polish delegates had to accept 
humiliating conditions: to receive the Curzon Line, to submit to the League of Nations’ 
decision settling the border with Lithuania (this signified leaving Vilna to Lithuania), in 
East Galicia and Cieszyn Silesia and to accept a limitation of Polish rights in Gdańsk. As a 
reward Poland received assistance: some munitions and a group of advisers called the 
Allied Mission. The Spa Agreement provoked mass protests in Poland and on July 24, 
1920 the Polish government had to resign. 
In July 1920 Poland was in an unfavorable military situation as the Soviet army 
launched a massive offensive. Polish southern frontlines were crossed by the Cavalry Army 
of Semyon Budyonny. In the east Tukhachevsky’s four armies advanced toward Warsaw. 
                                                 
33 Jabłonowski, Marek et all, ed. Raporty i informacje Biura Propagandy Zagranicznej Prezydium Rady 
Ministrów 1920-21 [Reports and information of the Polish Foreign Propaganda Bureau of the Council of 
Ministers 1920-21]. Warszawa – Pułtusk: 2002, document No. 3, 5, 7, pp. 22, 27, 29. 
34 The Curzon Line had come a long way. Soviet propaganda caught on to the idea first: after the Peace 
Treaty of Riga all the territories west of the Curzon Line (extending approx. 200 miles) were proclaimed by 
the Soviets as occupied by Poland. The longest part of the Curzon Line was the border between the Third 
Reich and the USSR, after they annihilated Poland in September 1939. In February 1945, F.D. Roosevelt 
and W. Churchill at Yalta traded allied Poland and other countries of Central Europe to Stalin for the Soviet 
front with Germany and Japan and for the sake of peace in Western Europe after the war, agreed that the 
eastern border of Poland would be on the Curzon Line as it has remained. 
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The Soviets treated the text of the Spa agreement as a weakness of the Great 
Powers. The Soviet Commissar for Foreign Affairs Chicherin replied to the telegram in 
an insulting tone attacking the Allied powers and the League of Nations. On July 17, the 
Soviets announced their peace conditions: reducing the Polish Army to 50,000 troops and 
handing over all Polish military equipment to Russia. The Allies maintained a stunned 
silence, while Poland rejected this proposal as unacceptable. 
 
2.3.2. The Colby Note 
On August 10, 1920, American Secretary of State Bainbridge Colby sent a note to 
Italian Ambassador Romano Avezzana explaining his Government’s attitudes toward 
Soviet Russia. A Polish diplomat accredited in Washington “summarized Wilsonian 
diplomacy toward Russia as a strange mixture of anti-Bolshevism and russophilism.”35 He 
clearly explained the American concept of the Russian issue: “With the exception of 
‘ethnic’ Poland and Finland, self determination was somehow to halt at the border of the 
tsarist empire, because Wilson believed that the preservation of Russian territorial integrity 
was in the best interest of the United States.”36 In other words, Colby presented the Wilson 
administration’s recognition of the Curzon line, which was treated in Poland as a temporary 
and artificially created demarcation line. Polish diplomats in Washington immediately 
signaled that the note could mean the end of American military supplies for Poland. 
 
 
 
                                                 
35 Winid, After the Colby Note, p. 1168. 
36 ibid, p. 1165. 
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2.3.3. The Breakthrough 
In August 1920 the Bolsheviks signed a treaty with Lithuania which allowed the 
Red Army to advance to Poland and surround Warsaw from its eastern side. On August 
12, newspapers all over Europe declared the capitulation of Warsaw and Poland. The 
communists in Berlin prepared for revolution.  
Unexpectedly, Marshal Piłsudski regrouped the Polish armies, creating three fronts 
from the existing two. The undertaking was daring and difficult, especially the transfer of 
the frontlines before the enemy lines, but it was performed successfully and at record 
speed. The Battle of Warsaw commenced on August 13 and was initially fought on the 
Northern and Central fronts along the line of the Vistula River. On August 16, Piłsudski 
again changed his plans: advancing the action by one day, he therefore launched a daring 
counteroffensive from his right flank, sixty miles south of Warsaw, from the base of the 
Wieprz River. This strike cut the Soviet communication lines, reinforced Polish armies on 
the Central and Northern Fronts and captured Soviet artillery and supplies. During the night 
of August 18, Marshal Tukhachevsky’s forces began to withdraw. The frontlines retreated 
north and eastward away from Warsaw. The Soviet invasion was repelled. 
The Battle of Warsaw, August 13-25, was almost immediately dubbed “The 
Miracle of the Vistula,” and was simultaneously the most severe defeat the Red Army 
suffered in its history.37 Sir Edgar Vincent (Viscount D’Abernon), the diplomatic chief of 
                                                 
37 Ironically, some responsibility for this defeat falls to Josef Stalin, then the Red Army commissar on the 
Southwestern front. Disregarding an order, he refused to send his armies to help protect Tukhachevsky’s 
forces from Piłsudski’s attack. (see: Thomas C. Fiddick. Russia’s Retreat from Poland, 1920: From 
Permanent Revolution to Peaceful Coexistence. New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1990. Chapter 12, pp. 218-
250.) Although Tukhachevsky never mentioned Stalin’s insubordination, this event could have played an 
important role in 1937 when Stalin decided to execute Tukhachevsky as a German spy. 
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the Anglo-French Mission to Poland and an eyewitness to the battle and further events, 
wrote in his diary: 
 The Battle of Tours saved our ancestors of Britain and our neighbours 
of Gaul from the yoke of the Koran; it is probable that the Battle of 
Warsaw preserved Central and parts of Western Europe from a more 
subversive danger – the fanatical tyranny of the Soviets.38 
 
Not everybody shared this enthusiasm. The Polish victory in the Battle of 
Warsaw:  
compelled the Russian ambassador to Washington […] to 
intervene at the State Department in order to prevent a further Polish 
military offensive. Despite the ambassador’s strong and fundamental 
criticism of Bolshevism, he zealously defended Russian territorial 
integrity no matter who was governing in Moscow. […] 
Colby sent his second note directly to Warsaw on August 21, […] 
he demanded that Poland halt offensive at the Curzon line, and that the 
Poles agree to an immediate cease-fire, which would prevent further 
military advance toward Russian territories.39 
 
Piłsudski then acted against advice from the West. The Polish forces 
counterattacked, while Tukhachevsky’s armies were in retreat. Between 15 and 25 
September, 1920, the Polish Army defeated the Bolshevik forces near Grodno in the 
second largest battle of the war known as the Battle of the Niemen River. Budyonny’s 
Cavalry Army was halted at the Battle of Zadwórze (August 17, 1920), and later 
                                                 
38 D’Abernon, Edgar Vincent, 1st Viscount. The Eighteenth Decisive Battle of the World: Warsaw, 1920. 
Westport, 1977 [reprint of the 1931 ed. published by Hodder and Stoughton, London], p. 9. 
39 Winid. “After the Colby Note,” p. 1166. 
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encircled and defeated at the Battle of Komarów (August 31, 1920)40 and the Battle of 
Hrubieszów (September 5, 1920). 
The Russian Army in Poland was destroyed. Circa 120,00041 Russians were 
captured and the rest fled to Prussia and through Lithuania to Russia. The Polish army 
was exhausted. Lenin sued for peace and the Allies pressured Piłsudski to halt. 
 
2.3.4 The Riga Peace Treaty 
“The signing of peace [with Poland] is now essential for us… we will win time 
and use it to strengthen our army” – wrote Lenin42. The armistice was signed on October 
12, 1920. Nine days later the peace conference began.  
The Treaty of Riga, signed on March 18, 1921, gave Poland a 
border in the east well beyond what the pacemakers had recommended 
and added even more minorities to its population: 4 million Ukrainians, 2 
million Jews and a million Byelorussians.43 
 
The Soviets never reconciled themselves to the Riga Treaty. Their propaganda 
portrayed the Treaty as an enforced dictate and a result of treacherous bourgeois policy 
towards the socialist state mentioning neither the lost war nor its aggressive character. 
For Soviet Russia the only legal border with Poland was the Curzon Line, and all the 
territories extending approximately 200 miles east of it were proclaimed by the Soviets as 
                                                 
40 The battle of Komarów is known – at least in Polish historiography – as the greatest cavalry battle since 
the Battle of Leipzig in 1813 and one of the last cavalry battles ever. 
41 Polish and Russian historians still argue over the number of Russian POWs, especially because of the 
very high mortality rate. The number of deaths in Polish prisoner of war camps varies from 18,000 
according to Polish sources to 60,000 as some Russian publications claim. However, the latest research on 
both sides indicates that Polish sources are more accurate (see the corresponding articles in the 
bibliography). 
42 Quoted from: Wojciech Materski. “The Second Polish Republic in Soviet Foreign Policy (1918-1939).” 
The Polish Review, 2000, XLV (3), p. 334. 
43 MacMillan. Paris 1919, p. 228. 
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being occupied by Poland. “Soviet foreign policy […] at first aimed at expanding the 
scale of revolution and then, after this ended in failure, at the best possible preparation for 
a future world war, viewed by Moscow as inevitable.”44 
In Soviet historiography and propaganda Poland was always portrayed as a part of 
anti-Bolshevik foreign intervention, organized and orchestrated by the Entente. It was 
Stalin who first coined the phrase Third Campaign of the Entente (Russian: Tretiy 
Pokhod Antanty) in his article in Pravda on May 25, 1920, where he mentioned Kolchak, 
Denikin and Piłsudski as the executors of the joint campaign. Since then the Polish-
Soviet war still is referred in the same way and Piłsudski was described as one of the 
mercenaries of the British, French and American imperialists and capitalists. 
In fact, the relations between Poland and the Entente in 1919 and 1920 were much 
more complicated and strenuous, as the Allies decided that Poland would not receive 
support in her Soviet war the way that White leaders Kolchak and Denikin were supported.  
The Third Campaign of the Entente, however, became the official Soviet version. 
In 1958 N. F. Kuzmin wrote:  
The imperialists of the United States, England, France and Japan 
[…] had organized in 1920 a new, the third in a row, military campaign 
against the Soviet State. This time the Entente decided to use the 
bourgeois and landowners’ Poland as the main striking force. ‘The 
Versailles’ Peace made out of Poland – indicated V. I. Lenin – a buffer 
state separating Germany from the Soviet communism, which is treated by 
the Entente as the weapon against the Bolsheviks.’45 
 
                                                 
44 Materski. “The Second Polish Republic,” p. 331. 
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Thereby the defeat in the Polish war could be portrayed as part of the victorious 
campaign against the Whites. The Riga Peace Treaty could be presented as a remnant of 
bourgeois and imperialist injustice. And thus the peaceable Soviet Republic was the 
righteous one, honestly maintaining the signed conditions. 
Along the same lines Soviet historians used to interpret any treaty or alliance 
signed by Poland during the interwar period as a hostile act towards the USSR and proof 
of Polish political adventurism. In 1991, A. Manusevich, in his study of the Polish-Soviet 
war, termed the Polish campaign “the righteous and defensive war of the young Soviet 
Republic” and concluded that “for the Soviet side the Peace Treaty of Riga was unjust.”46 
This formula was inherited by Russian historians after 1991. In 1992, in a Russian 
review article about the British and American publications on the Polish-Soviet war, the 
author disputes any publication which casts a shadow on the idealized picture of the 
Soviet side. He emphasized that everything written on this subject in Great Britain and 
the USA was biased, favoring the Polish side.47  
This helps understand why the majority of Russian historians justify the Nazi-
Soviet agreement and the secret paragraphs of the Ribbentrop-Molotov Pact (August 23, 
1939) and vindicate the partition of Poland between the Third Reich and the USSR in 
September 1939.  
 
 
                                                 
46 Manusevich, A. Ya. “Трудный путь к рижскому мирному договору 1921 г.” [A difficult road toward 
the Riga Peace Treaty of 1921]. Novaya i Noveysha Istoria [Russia], vol. 1, 1991, Izdatelstvo Nauka, 
Moscow, p. 42. 
47 See: Ostapenko, A. I. “Англо-американская историография советско-польской войны 1919-1920 
гг.” (The British and American historiography on the Soviet-Polish war 1919-1920]. Vestnik Moskovskogo 
Universiteta, vol. 3, seria 8, 1992, Moskva, 79-88. 
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2.4. Eastern Border: Lithuania. The Historical Background 
As mentioned the union between Poland and Lithuania, signed in 1569 in Lublin, 
was the last stage of the nearly 200 years of integration of these two states. Incorporating 
territories of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania at the end of the eighteenth century, Russia 
launched a long-term campaign of supplanting and erasing Polish traces. This meant that 
the Tsarist Empire had to reverse and annihilate 400 years of the natural process of 
diffusion. By the end of the eighteenth century, Polish culture dominated Lithuania and 
Polish was widely and commonly spoken. This cultural infiltration was natural without 
any state or church orchestration. Such influence was made impossible, as the 
Commonwealth’s law allowed only Lithuanians to hold office in the Grand Duchy.  
Lithuanian separatism, if it existed, was never directed against the Polish 
language and culture, which was accepted, and popularized by the Lithuanian aristocracy, 
middle class, nobility and townspeople. “The last Lithuanian grand duke who even knew 
the Lithuanian language died in the year Columbus discovered America.”48 The 
Lithuanian language survived among the lowest levels of the Lithuanian peasants.  
The Polonization process in these times spread regardless of religion, even 
reaching Russia – in the seventeenth century at the Moscow court the Polish language 
was fashionable and connected with high and refined culture. However, nationalism in its 
contemporary meaning did not exist then.  
After the failure of the 1863 January Uprising, “Russian authorities generally 
regarded Polish elites as the enemy of consequence, the Lithuanian national movement as 
the way to weaken that enemy, and Belarusian peasants as part of the Russian nation.”49 
                                                 
48 Snyder. The reconstruction of nations, p. 32. 
49 Ibid., p. 49. 
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Eradication of the Polish influence and the erasing of traces of the Commonwealth were 
performed by the Russian government in a twofold manner. The first was to displace and 
physically eliminate Polish speaking people, especially from the upper classes. Countless 
death penalty verdicts, exile of thousands to Siberia and police persecution were 
accompanied by restrictive fiscal policy and the depravation of political and civil rights. 
The second method was based on the Roman proverb divide et impera: divide and 
rule. As there was no anti-Polish opposition in the former Grand Duchy of Lithuania – it 
had to be created. The Tsarist government developed a number of institutions aimed at 
falsifying history. The Polish-Lithuanian union was presented as a brutal conquest and 
forced Polonization of Lithuania. After 1863 the Polish language was strictly banned from 
official and public use in the Russian Empire, while Lithuanian (which then had to be 
printed in Cyrillic characters) was added to the curriculum. The government created 
scholarships for Lithuanian speaking students at the level of elementary and secondary 
education. For further education the Lithuanians were directed to the colleges in Central 
Russia where they were Russianized and formed against Poles and the former Poland. 
The new Lithuanian elite were inculcated with the belief of Polish hostility, the 
distinction between Poles and Lithuanians, and of the centuries-old Polish oppression of 
Lithuania – inspiring extreme nationalism and chauvinism. The same methods, if they 
had been implemented in the United States after the Civil War, would have made the 
Southerners and Northerners mortal enemies forever. 
Russia’s real intentions were apparent. To Russians, the Lithuanians were no 
danger and without any risk, their national consciousness could be awoken, only to 
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detach them from Poland. In the future, after resolving the Polish issue, Russia expected 
to absorb the Lithuanian streamlet without a problem.  
 
2.4.1. Eastern Border: Lithuania and Poland 1918-1920. 
The rebirth of Lithuania ran according to Russia’s bidding, mostly under the 
banner of hatred toward Poland and erasing the Polish inheritance from Lithuanian 
culture. This explains why Józef Piłsudski’s idea of a post-war federation had no chance 
in the influential circles of the new independent Lithuanian Republic. Piłsudski was born 
in Lithuania to a family settled there for hundreds of years. He considered himself both 
Lithuanian and Polish. However Piłsudski’s arguments were rejected a priori by the new 
Lithuania. At the same time the idea of a federation was opposed with equal virulence by 
Polish National Democrats, who treated Lithuanian, Belarusian and Ukrainian lands as 
anything but Polish territories. 
The Lithuanian nationalists, holding local offices even during tsarist times 
showed themselves to be rabid persecutors of the Polish people. After its declaration of 
independence in 1918, Lithuania was governed by nationalist and Christian-democrats 
(excluding the brief period of the Lithuanian Soviet Socialist Republic created by 
Bolsheviks after the Red Army took Vilna in January 191950). They not only blocked any 
reforms but also opposed establishing equal rights for ethnic minorities and forging good 
relations with Poland on an equal basis.  
                                                 
50 For the Bolsheviks the Lithuania’s independence was always only temporary. In 1940 Lithuania was 
incorporated into the Soviet Empire as the “socialist republic,” an act which was confirmed in 1945. 
Independence, which came with the collapse of the USSR in 1990, brought with it Lithuania’s membership 
in NATO and the European Union. Recently (March 2005), Lithuanian President Valdas Adamkus rejected 
Russia’s invitation to the ceremonies of the 60th anniversary of the victory over the Nazi Germany. For 
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occupation and new suppression. 
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In 1920, the Lithuanian government signed the anti-Polish treaty with Soviet 
Russia. Piłsudski, realizing that his idea of a federation had no chance, arranged the 
creation of the puppet state of Central Lithuania by “mutinied” army units – the only way 
to take under Polish jurisdiction the lands where only about four percent of the population 
was ethnically Lithuanian.  
Pursuing Red Army survivors, Polish troops entered disputed Lithuanian territories. 
Though born in Vilna, Piłsudski could not openly counter the Allies decision to leave his 
hometown on the Lithuanian side. However, as a man of action in war and diplomacy, 
Piłsudski gave a special order to General Lucjan Żeligowski, another Polish Lithuanian, to 
arrange a mutiny in his Division. On October 12, 1920, “the rebels” seized Vilna with its 
surrounding regions, inhabited by the Polish majority and proclaimed “the independent” 
Republic of Central Lithuania (Polish: Litwa Środkowa), altogether about 10,000 square 
miles, less then half of the prewar Vilna province. The protests of an infuriated Lithuania 
were in vain. “Officially, Warsaw treated Middle Lithuania as a sovereign state and sent a 
diplomatic representative to Wilno.”51 In 1922, the parliament of the new puppet state 
unanimously voted to incorporate Central Lithuania into Poland.52 The merger was 
accepted by the League of Nations in 1923. However Lithuania rejected all attempts at 
settlement and remained in a state of war with Poland until 1938. 
 
                                                 
51 M. K. Dziewanowski. Joseph Pilsudski: a European Federalist, 1918-1922. Stanford, CA, [1969], p. 319. 
This author translates “Litwa Środkowa” as Middle Lithuania, and uses the Polish name of its capital – 
Wilno. 
52 “With the covert support of President Madison, American adventurers staged a bloodless revolt in 
Spanish West Florida between Louisiana and the Pearl River. They raised the American flag and declared 
their independence. This ‘republic’ was quickly recognized by the U.S. government and annexed as a part 
of Louisiana in 1811.” [Goldfield, David and others. The American Journey. Vol. I. Upper Saddle River, 
N.J., Pearson 2004, p. 272]. Piłsudski probably did not know this episode from American history, however, 
the similarity of these two cases is striking. No coincidence: in certain situations some solutions are 
obvious.  
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2.5. Eastern Border: Belarus 
On the land inhabited by the Belarusians, the tsarist regime suppressed any signs 
of Belarusian independence, beginning with the language (then written in the Latin 
alphabet) through the confiscation of properties from Belarusian nobility. The Belarusians 
took part in the Polish insurrections in 1830 and 1863. Belarusian political leaders opted 
for the Polish-Lithuanian federation with autonomous Belarus as part of it. Russian police 
persecuted and punished them even with capital punishment. “After the 1863 uprising, 
Belarusians could not publish in Belarusian in the Russian empire. Before 1905, the rest 
of the Belarusian national revival had to take place in faraway Cracow, Posen, and 
Vienna.”53 On the cusp of the nineteenth and twentieth century the Belarusian intellectual 
elite was ready to create an independent Belarusian state. 
The Bolsheviks, after their victory in Belarus in November 1917, introduced the 
Soviet system. On February 21, 1918, German units entered Minsk and established the new 
front on the Dnieper River one hundred miles east. The Belarusian historian Oleg 
Łatyszonek relates that Bolshevik forces were ousted by the Belarusian and Polish units on 
February 19/20, before German forces appeared. He terms it “the liberation of Minsk.”54  
On March 25, 1918, Belarus declared its independence for the first time – with 
Germany’s assistance the democratic Belarusian People’s Republic was formed. 
After the German army’s withdrawal, the Bolsheviks nullified the Brest-Litovsk 
Treaty (November 13, 1918) and on January 1, 1919, created the Byelorussian Soviet 
Socialist Republic – formally independent, the state was subordinated to Soviet Russia. 
On February 27, the Central Committee of the Soviet Communist Party created the Soviet 
                                                 
53 Snyder. The reconstruction of nations, p. 46. 
54 Łatyszonek, Oleg. Białoruskie formacje wojskowe 1917-1923 [The Belarusian military formations 1917-
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Socialist Republic of Lithuania and Byelorussia called Litbyel. On August 8, 1919, Minsk 
was seized by the Polish Army. A year later, in July and August 1920, the Red Army 
marched through Belarus twice: during its advance toward Poland then with its retreat. 
Soon after, the Polish army entered Belarus.  
In the Polish-Soviet war many Belarusian units fought on the Polish side, but they 
were unable to regain independence. The 1921 Peace Treaty of Riga established the Polish 
border in this region. The eastern part of Belarus, with Minsk, was left on the Soviet side, 
while the western part was given to Poland.55  
In the peace negotiations which produced the Riga Peace Treaty, Russia formally 
represented the theoretically independent Socialist Soviet Byelorussia. Officially, the 
Peace Treaty recognized the independent republics of Byelorussia56 and Ukraine. The 
document was labeled “The Treaty of Peace between Poland and Russia and Ukraine” and 
its preamble stated: “the Government of the Russian Socialist Soviet Republic on behalf of 
itself and authorized by the Government of the Byelorussian Socialist Soviet Republic and 
the Government of the Ukrainian Socialist Soviet Republic.”57 By signing the document, 
the Polish delegation, predominantly consisting of National Democrats, sanctioned 
Poland’s formal recognition of the two Soviet puppet states. The delegation deliberately 
resigned from keeping vast Belarusian and Ukrainian territories, with cities of Minsk and 
Kamieniec Podolski, on the Polish side to prevent the future creation of an independent 
Belarus and Ukraine, thus forever halting Piłsudski’s idea of a federation.58 
                                                 
55 Głogowska, Helena. Białoruś 1914-1929. Kultura pod presją polityki [Belarus 1914-1929: Culture under 
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56 Byelorussia/Belarus - see: footnote #13 
57 The Peace Treaty of Riga, Przymierze, 1921, XIV-XV, pp. 3-4. 
58 Hauser, Przemysław. “Federacyjna wizja Rzeczypospolitej w poglądach Józefa Piłsudskiego i próba jej 
urzeczywistnienia w latach 1918-1921” [The federal vision of the Polish Republic in Piłsudski’s opinion 
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The Polish Parliament dominated by National Democrats, political adversaries of 
Piłsudski,59 ratified the Treaty.60 This was one of the reasons for Piłsudski’s retiring from 
politics. “Sickened by the wrangling of the parties, by the continued attacks of the 
National Democrats [...] he refused to run as a candidate in the presidential election of 
1922, and resigned his office as Commander-in-Chief.”61 
Allied recognition of the Riga treaty ceded Ukraine and Belarus to the Bolshevik 
regime.  
 
2.6 Eastern Border: Ukraine Again 
“I apologize to you, gentlemen. I really do.” Piłsudski’s words to the Ukrainian 
officers and soldiers62 were honest and sincere but could not compensate for the 
Ukrainian lost chance for independence and democracy. In April 1920 a military-political 
alliance between Poland and the Ukraine was signed in Warsaw. Its military part 
stipulated that joint combat actions would be instituted against Soviet Russia, Ukrainian 
forces fought with the Polish army against the Bolsheviks in the Battle of Warsaw, 
Niemen River and at Komarów.63  
The Peace Treaty of Riga was negotiated under the vigilant eyes of the Allied 
Powers, who attempted to keep the future borders as close to the Curzon Line as possible. 
Thus, as stated with fully cooperation of the Polish delegates, a vast portion of the Ukraine 
                                                                                                                                                 
1920 i jego następstwa [Poland and Ukraine. The 1920 alliance and its aftermath]. Uniwersytet M. 
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59 see. Chapter 2.2.1, p. 24. 
60 See: Ajnenkiel. “Polityka Polski,” p. 15. 
61 Davies. White Eagle, p. 270. 
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63 See: Udovichenko, O.I. Україна у війні за державність. Істория організацїі і бойових діŭ 
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was ceded to Russia. For Ukrainians it signified that their country was divided between 
Poland and Soviet Russia.  
The armistice and the later peace treaty in Riga between Poland and Soviet Russia 
was, in fact, a unilateral breach of the Warsaw Agreement between Poland and the 
democratic Ukrainian People’s Republic.64 The Ukrainian military forces continued their 
fight against the Bolsheviks. Defeated on November 20, 1920, Ukrainian units crossed 
the Polish border and were interned. About 30,000 Ukrainian soldiers and civilians were 
exiled in Poland.65  Later some of these soldiers emigrated to Germany, Austria and 
Czechoslovakia. The Bolshevik authorities persecuted those who illegally returned to the 
Soviet Ukraine. The head of the Ukrainian People’s Republic, Symon Petlura emigrated 
to Paris, where he was assassinated in 1926.66 
 
2.7 Western Border: Germany. 
In 1919 in Paris, the five members of the German foreign office were received by 
Georges Clemenceau with harsh words: “The time has now come for a heavy reckoning of 
the accounts. You have asked for peace. We are prepared to offer you a peace.” The leader 
of the German delegation, count Ulrich Brockdorf-Rantzau answered in a similar spirit: 
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“We are under no illusions as to the extent of our defeat and the degree of our 
powerlessness. We know that the strength of the German arm is broken. We know the 
intensity of the hatred which meets us, and we have heard the victors’ passionate demand 
that as the vanquished we shall be made to pay, and as the guilty we shall be punished.” 
Germany, however, never fully accepted the final verdict of the Allies. Brockdorf-
Rantzau’s continued: “The demand is made that we shall acknowledge that we alone are 
guilty of having caused the war. Such a confession in my mouth would be a lie.”67  
Nevertheless, considering that Germany lost World War I, she lost only 13.5 
percent of her territory. South Germany lost nothing, and in the north only a small strip of 
Schleswig (to Denmark). In the west: the Rhineland, although demilitarized and occupied, 
remained German; two small districts had to be transferred to Belgium; Alsace-Lorraine 
had to be returned to France; the coal-mines of the Saar also went to France, but the 
Saarland was administered by the League of Nations for 15 years, then a plebiscite had to 
decide whether the inhabitants would be German, French or independent68. 
Germany sustained much greater loses in the east. The port city of Memel 
(Lithuanian: Klaipeda) founded by Germans in the thirteenth century, with a vast German 
majority and the surrounding region with the population of 140,000, was occupied by the 
French and granted to Lithuania. Danzig (Polish: Gdańsk) became a Free City under the 
sovereignty of the League of Nations. The future of the territories over the Vistula River, 
the borderlands between East Prussia and Poland and Upper Silesia had to be determined 
after plebiscites.  
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Above all, the famous corridor, splitting East Prussia from the rest 
of Germany and consisting of portions of Posen and West Prussia, was 
ceded to Poland to give it access to the Baltic Sea. This was one of the 
most difficult decisions of the conference and one particularly resented by 
Germany, but it was probably the least bad solution to an impossible 
problem, for a clear majority of the inhabitants of the Polish Corridor were 
Polish, despite prewar German colonization.69 
 
2.7.1 Insurrection in Great-Poland70 
There is no doubt that the fate of Great-Poland region would have been different 
without its insurrection on December 27, 1918. The Poles mobilized a 70,000-strong army 
led by General Józef Dowbór-Muśnicki. The fighting with the voluntarily nationalistic 
units of German Grenzschutz and Heimatschutz was ferocious and violent. The Germans 
lost control over this territory. In February 1919, Germany had to sign an armistice under 
Allied pressure. The will of the Polish inhabitants was expressed clearly enough to avoid a 
plebiscite. This was the first and last Polish insurrection that ended successfully.  
 
2.8 The Plebiscites 
Theoretically, the plebiscite is a way to determine true ethnic borders, assuming 
that people vote according to their nationality. Practice, however, can show something 
different. Plebiscites were held to legalize incorporations of territory. During the 1919 
plebiscite in Voralberg, held on the basis of the Saint-Germain Peace Treaty with Austria, 
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the indisputably German population voted for Switzerland to avoid the consequences of 
losing the war. Realizing this, the Swiss Government refused to incorporate the region.  
In the case of Germany the Treaty of Versailles ordered plebiscites on ethnically 
mixed areas: Germany’s frontier with Denmark (Schleswig), France (the Saar) and 
Poland (Allenstein, Marienwerder71 and Upper Silesia). On the territories disputed by 
Poland and Germany, after more than 100 years of Germanization, the results of the 
plebiscites could only favor of the latter. At the same time “the German request for a 
plebiscite in Alsace-Lorraine had been rejected by the Allies, on the grounds that these 
were evacuated territories reintegrated to France.”72 
The right of vote was given to people “born within the area where the vote will take 
place”73 whether residents or not. “This arrangement resulted […] from a request by the 
Polish delegation to the conference, who reportedly planned to bring Polish émigrés not 
only from industrial Westphalia and other parts of Germany, but from the United States as 
well.”74 The Germans initially protested, considering this proposal favoring the Polish side. 
 
2.9 Northern Border: Germany – Plebiscites in Masuria and Ermland 
The first plebiscite took place on the Northern border of Poland in the German 
province of East Prussia on July 11, 1920. The Commission of Polish Affairs in Paris 
accepted the Polish claims and reasons for the incorporation of the disputed territories into 
Poland, however, “the Supreme Council, under the pressure of the British delegation, 
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decided to hold a plebiscite there.”75 David Lloyd George objected by saying that “those 
territories are German in fact, and I have never understood the necessity of organizing any 
plebiscite there.”76 In spite of these objections, international forces were sent to the region, 
but were outnumbered by German paramilitary units: in the Olsztyn region (German: 
Regierungsbezirk Allenstein) the allied unit had 800 men while Sicherpolizei, Grenzschutz 
and Buergewehr had 3,800 troops armed with light and heavy weapons, including mortars 
and machine guns. The international forces did not intervene when the Germans terrorized 
the Polish inhabitants and voters, although the envoys saw the situation clearly and reported 
it to their headquarters. Edward Renne, a British envoy and the Chairman of the 
International Commission, saw the presence of the international forces as the need of 
“peaceful occupation,” when he wrote: “we have to do anything to accentuate our presence 
here but our any move can scatter the already scanty occupying force.”77 
The German side made the most of the Polish delegation’s idea of granting voting 
rights to nonresidents. The Deutscher Schutzbund was responsible for finding and 
transporting people born in the plebiscite area, but not living there. Most of the 
applications were not signed – the Germans convinced the Commission in Paris that 
“written application” is not the same as “personal and individual application,” and the 
signature as well as the ID during voting was not needed. The International Commission 
in the Olsztyn region examined the voting lists three days before the plebiscite and found 
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that at least one third of the candidates did not write or sign the paper personally.78 In 
Olsztyn the Germans counted 157,740 emigrants on their lists – the Polish side protested 
at least half of them, but without any effects. 
The Polish government could not give support to the Polish voters and activists due 
to the Polish-Soviet war. In the days preceding the plebiscite, the Red Army was approaching 
Warsaw and German propaganda was warning that the temporary emotions should not 
obscure the fact that Poland would soon cease to exist, and the Bolsheviks would take her 
provinces. The results were unfavorable for Poland, who gained only a few villages: 92 
percent of the voters in Ermland and 98 percent in Masuria voted for Germany.  
 
2.10 The Free City of Gdańsk 
The Baltic port city of Gdańsk (German: Danzig) was Pomerania’s biggest town. 
Originally Slavic and Polish, it was seized by the Teutonic Knights in 1308, returned to 
Poland in the fifteenth century and to Prussia again in 1772, along with the entire region. 
In 1918, the struggle over Pomerania between Germany and the newly independent 
Poland broke out immediately. The Treaty of Versailles ended German domination of 
Pomerania, giving Poland 62 percent of the West Prussian territories, while proclaiming 
Gdańsk a free city governed by the League of Nations.  
The compromise proved unworkable. The Polish population was about 12 percent 
of all inhabitants of the Free City. Poles were harassed and their rights were gradually 
hindered. When the Nazis came to power, Germany denounced most of the agreements 
and the question of a corridor broke out. This issue was the main pretext for Hitler’s 
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aggression against Poland and the first shells in World War II fell on the Polish depot of 
Westerplatte in the harbor area within the Free City of Gdańsk.  
 
2.11 Southern Border: Germany – Upper Silesia 
Upper Silesia was, and still is, the richest and most industrialized area in this part 
of Europe. Its main product is coal as well as zinc, iron, steel. The disputed region had 2 
million inhabitants and its area was approximately 4,130 square miles (comparatively, 
that is almost 75 percent of Connecticut). 
 The award of this region to Poland would give her a desperately 
needed industrial base and thus the means to withstand German economic 
domination; by the same token, an award to Germany would not only 
restore her entire prewar industrial potential – already the greatest in 
Europe in 1914 – but would also lead to her economic domination of 
Central and Eastern Europe, including Poland. […] Both the Germans and 
the Poles claimed Upper Silesia on ethnic grounds.79 
 
Historically, in 1335 the Polish king Casimir III the Great formally dropped his 
claims to Silesia and, in exchange, Bohemian king John the Blind of Luxemburg dropped 
his claims to the Polish crown. In 1355 Silesia became part of a Holy Roman Empire 
when king Charles IV was crowned emperor. In 1437 the House of Luxemburg died out 
and Bohemia was then governed by the successors from the Habsburg dynasty. 
In the eighteenth century Silesia was taken by Prussia, and became part of the 
German Empire after Germany’s unification in 1871. Thus, Germany claimed Silesia also 
on historic grounds. 
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T. Hunt Tooley, in his study of the Polish-German Ethnic dispute in Upper 
Silesia, presents the ethnic proportions of this region.  
 The Poles […] formed the bottom of the rural social scale, the 
middle and top consisting of German farmers with medium holdings and 
the magnates who owned vast estates. […] Industry appeared likewise 
[…]: the unskilled and low-paid jobs mostly belonged to the Poles, better 
positions and management tasks to the Germans. Hence, although there 
existed a Polish middle class of shopkeepers, doctors, lawyers and 
journalists – that is, the social level most closely associated with national 
awareness, especially in the nineteenth century – numerically that class 
remained fairly modest before the war.80 
 
Initially, the Commission on Polish Affairs decided to incorporate most of Upper 
Silesia into Poland, based on a survey of sixty-five percent of Polish-speaking 
inhabitants. Enraged Germany protested firmly and vigorously. 
 The Silesian mines were responsible for almost a quarter of 
Germany’s annual output of coal, 81 percent of its zinc and 34 percent of its 
lead. The German Government argued that [...] the people of Upper Silesia 
were German and Czech and the local Poles, whose dialect was heavily 
influenced by German, had never demonstrated the slightest interest in the 
Polish cause. Upper Silesia had been separated from Poland for centuries; 
its prosperity owed everything to German industry and German capital. 
Poland already has enough coal; Germany, particularly with the loss of the 
Saar, did not. ‘Germany cannot spare Upper Silesia; Poland does not need 
it.’ If Germany lost Upper Silesia, the German note concluded, it would not 
be able to fulfill its other obligations under the treaty.81 
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Under the pressure of the British delegation the Council of Four agreed that the 
future of Upper Silesia should be decided by a plebiscite. 
 In an acrimonious meeting on June 3, Clemenceau categorically 
opposed a plebiscite. Although Poles were in majority, they could not 
possibly vote freely when the local administration was still German. 
Wilson agreed. His experts told him that the big landowners and capitalists 
were all Germans. Well then, said Lloyd George, the Allies would have to 
bring in troops to supervise the voting. It would be a small price to pay if 
it avoided trouble with Germany over the treaty. ‘It is better to send an 
American or English division to Upper Silesia than an army to Berlin.’82 
 
Finally, the Treaty of Versailles assigned Poland only a small part of Silesia (art. 
87) and provided for a plebiscite in Upper Silesia (art. 88). Polish inhabitants were 
disappointed, since it was expected that the entire Upper Silesia and half of Middle 
Silesia would be Polish. The 1921 plebiscite was preceded by a campaign that produced 
intense controversy and violent confrontations, particularly by ethnic Poles seeking to 
preempt the plebiscite and force Polish annexation.  
 
2.11.1 The First and Second Uprising 
On June 11, 1919, General Henri-Louis-Edouard Le Rond, adjutant to Marshal 
Foch and later the head of the Inter-Allied Commission in Upper Silesia, reported the 
situation in the region to the Council of Four:  
Since the Armistice, the Germans have done everything possible to 
keep Polish opinion in check. The Polish press has been suppressed. 
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Polish priests have been sent to other dioceses. The Germans of Upper 
Silesia have been organized into a kind of militia […] at present the 
inhabitants are unable to express their feelings freely. Besides, everything 
is being done to persuade them that separation from Germany would be a 
disaster for them […] if Upper Silesia should become Polish, the money in 
savings banks would be lost.83 
 
In these circumstances it should be no surprise that three violent uprisings broke 
out in Upper Silesia. The first started on the night of August 16-17, 1919.  
[…] the first of three so-called Polish uprisings broke out on the 
occasion of the general strike in the industrial area. The insurrection was 
quickly successful in the two southeastern counties of Rybnik and Pless 
[Polish: Pszczyna], which were the Polish strongholds; but as the Polish 
forces massed for a push northward into the industrial area they met strong 
German resistance. The German Commissioner for Upper Silesia […] Otto 
Hörsing […] proclaiming martial law and a state of siege, he ordered 
German troops against the insurrectionists and succeeded in reestablishing 
his authority over the entire area within a week. Naturally each side accused 
the other of precipitating the conflict and resorting to inhuman measures.84 
 
In the meantime – to attract voters – the Polish Diet decided that Silesia, once 
incorporated into Poland, would have broad autonomy, extensive local government and a 
separate Parliament.  
 After the Treaty of Versailles finally took effect on January 10, 
1920, the interallied plebiscite commission assumed control of Upper 
                                                 
83 Link. The deliberations of the Council of Four, vol. II, pp. 389-390 
84 Campbell, F. Gregory. “The Struggle for Upper Silesia, 1919-1922.” Journal of Contemporary History 
Sep. 1970 42 (3), p. 362. 
55 
Silesia in early February. […] The occupational forces were 
overwhelmingly French, as were the administrative personnel of the 
commission. The French sent 11,000 troops, the Italians 2,000, and the 
British none; of the twenty one district controllers, eleven were French, 
five Italian and five British.85 
 
In August 1920, the next armed combat broke out. In Polish historiography it is 
called the Second Silesian Uprising,86 and lasted from August 19-20 till August 25, 1920. 
At the same time in Central Poland the Bolshevik Red Army was surrounding Warsaw 
and Marshal Tukhachevsky, the Soviet Commander-in-Chief was ready to enter the city. 
 
On 15 August, the editor of the local German newspaper in Gleiwitz 
(Gliwice) decided to anticipate the fall of Warsaw without waiting for 
confirmation. On 16 August, a German mob appeared on the streets hailing 
the Soviet victory and bearing aloft images of Lenin and Trotsky. The next 
day a similar demonstration was organized in Kattowitz (Katowice), where 
the French garrison was besieged in its barracks. For forty-eight hours the 
German terror raged unchecked. A violent response was unavoidable. […] 
At dawn on 19 August, the bands of the Silesian POW87 moved through the 
province and occupied the plebiscite area. […] during the exact period when 
the Polish Army was fighting to save Warsaw from the Soviets, the Poles of 
Silesia fought to save their homes from the Germans.88 
 
“The main object of Polish efforts was the disbandment of the German security 
police since it was largely through that body that Germans continued to exercise 
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influence in the area”89 – writes F. Gregory Campbell. As the result of these clashes the 
Interallied Commission replaced the German security police with mixed Polish-German 
plebiscite gendarmerie. After this, Germany openly declared that without Upper Silesia 
the repayment of the war reparations would be impossible.  
 
2.11.2 Plebiscite in Upper Silesia 
The Allies fixed the plebiscite for March 20, 1921. According to the Peace Treaty 
of Versailles:  
[…] the right to vote shall be given to all persons without 
distinction of sex who: […] were born in the plebiscite area or have been 
domiciled there since a date to be determined by the Commission, which 
shall not be subsequent to January 1, 1919, or who have been expelled by 
the German authorities and have not retained their domicile there.90  
 
The provision of granting voting rights to nonresidents requested by Polish 
delegates for the plebiscite in Allenstein and Marienwerder was also inserted – with 
French support – into the final rules for the Upper Silesian referendum. The Germans, 
who initially protested, learned very soon that this arrangement could be beneficial if 
only they would provide the transportation and accommodation to their voters. “The 
well-organized and -executed outvoter program proved to be the most successful German 
effort in terms both of propaganda value and of delivering votes, literally, for the German 
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cause.”91 The Deutscher Schutzbund arranged and paid for trips to Upper Silesia for more 
than 150,000 German-oriented outvoters. The Polish side managed to bring only 50,000. 
The plebiscite “took place in a surprisingly peaceful atmosphere. Both Warsaw 
and Berlin had accused each other of making military preparations in order to disrupt the 
voting, but neither side was yet willing to resort openly to force.”92 
The week before 20 March […] saw several violent incidents: a 
Polish woman and a little girl were killed in a political altercation in 
Gleiwitz; some outvoter barracks were blown up, some outvoters beaten. 
But the French were able to report to Paris four days before the 
referendum that ‘all external political activity is suspended as Upper 
Silesia awaits its plebiscite.’ […] Most observers still recognized that 
violent confrontation was possible at any moment. Therefore, when 
Sunday, 20 March, came and went without the outbreak of violence, the 
peaceful balloting evoked general astonishment. Indeed, Colonel Henry 
Percival marveled that ‘the 20th of March must be recorded as one of the 
quietest days experienced in Upper Silesia since August 1920.’93 
 
The Germans won by approximately 60 to 40 percent. Surprisingly, only about 
seventy percent of the ethnic Poles voted for Poland.94 
Even if counted without the 150,000 outvoters – non-resident 
native Upper Silesians […] some 54% of the remaining voters opted for 
Germany; all this under a phenomenally high voter participation figure of 
97.5%. […] Those who favoured Poland immediately charged the 
Germans with intimidation, citing Freikorps-type violence and other 
                                                 
91 Tooley. National identity, p. 235. 
92 Campbell, “The Struggle for Upper Silesia,” p. 372. 
93 Tooley. National identity, p. 234, 236. 
94 See Tooley. “The Polish-German Ethnic Dispute,” pp. 13-20. 
58 
factors adverse to the Poles. Yet neither the contemporary documentary 
evidence from the German and Polish sides nor the records of the 
Interallied Commission, nor voting behaviour in the plebiscite itself, 
supports this contention.95 
 
There could be several other reasons for this choice. The identification with 
Germany was a result of long and successful business activities and the association with 
Protestant religion. The German propaganda warned workers, that in Poland they would 
loose pensions and jobs. German employers out of Silesia refused to give free days to 
Silesian born Poles during the plebiscite period – in the Ruhr region alone roughly ten 
thousand Polish Silesians were halted under threat of loosing their jobs.  
However, the question why so many ethnic Poles participated in the third Silesian 
uprising which broke out after the plebiscite remains. One of the reasons was uncertainty.  
On one hand there were voting results, on the other hand was the decision of the 
Allies. After the plebiscite, Berlin began to claim the entire Silesia region and gossip 
about the possible agreement to this demand by the Allies spread in the area.  
[The British and the Italians’] solution would have given Poland 
only 23 percent of the population and 25 percent of the communes, 
whereas 40 percent of the votes and 42 percent of the communes had gone 
for Poland in the plebiscite. Even worse for the Poles, all the developed 
industrial area would have stay with Germany.  
On May 1 a newspaper article entitled ‘The Diplomats Have 
Spoken’ appeared the false report that the interallied commission had 
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decided in favor of the British-Italian boundary proposal. It served as a 
cue for the third and largest Polish uprising.96 
 
2.11.3. The Third Upper Silesian Uprising 
The third uprising started at night on May 2-3, 1921. This event is still discussed by 
historians. Those favoring Poland say the ethnic Polish Silesians wanted to unify with the 
motherland. However, even the most biased of commentators cannot deny that the uprising 
was ignited to object the legal, peaceful and democratic voting in which the Polish side was 
outvoted. Also, the core of the Polish Silesian insurgents consisted of regular military units 
sent secretly from the Polish side, as Poland officially condemned the Uprising and could 
not openly act against the Allies, against the Treaty and the plebiscite results. 
On the German side were the paramilitary units, calling themselves the “self-
protection forces.” Their leader, General Karl Höfer quickly transformed these voluntary 
units, consisting of war veterans, into assault troops. Their counterattacks produced heavy 
fights with Polish insurgents. The biggest battle of St. Anne Mountain was lost by the 
insurgents, however, the Polish Silesian leaders won politically. Under their influence the 
Allies set up the neutral zone between both forces. 
Top officials of the British Foreign Office were apprehensive 
about a possible clash between the German forces and the French 
plebiscite troops. There was deep fear in London that the French would 
seize such an opportunity to invade the Ruhr area. […] Nor was it in 
German interests in Upper Silesia itself to press the military campaign, for 
Korfanty’s forces repeated their threat to destroy the mines and factories 
of the industrial area before being driven out of the province. […] By early 
                                                 
96 Campbell. “The Struggle for Upper Silesia,” p. 376. 
60 
June the main activity of the plebiscite commission consisted in trying to 
establish a neutral zone between the Polish insurgents and the German 
paramilitary forces. […] After successfully establishing the neutral zone, 
they then brought about the simultaneous withdrawal from Upper Silesia 
of the German and the Polish forces during the first week of July; the 
plebiscite commission thus managed to regain some of its lost prestige. 
The Germans and the Poles had matched force with force and had fought 
to a standstill. The fate of Upper Silesia still hung in the balance.97 
 
The dispute concerning Upper Silesia at the meeting of the Supreme Council 
brought serious disagreements between David Lloyd George and the French Prime 
Minister Aristide Briand.  
Briand and Lloyd George fought each other town by town and 
commune by commune. […] Lloyd George won Briand’s quick agreement 
to turn the matter over to the League. […] The Upper Silesian situation 
afforded, for the first time, an opportunity for the League of Nations to 
demonstrate its ability to settle a key issue among the great powers.98 
 
The case was decided by the representatives of four nonpartisan nations – 
Belgium, China, Spain and Brazil. On October 12, 1921, the League of Nations 
recommended that Poland would have one third of the contested area (1,255 out of 4,130 
square miles) containing the most industrial installations. Also, Poland obtained almost 
half of the 2 million inhabitants (965,000). The Conference of Ambassadors accepted the 
plan seven days later. 
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 The German cabinet was shocked, and at least one member 
claimed that Germany had been cheated. […] The difficulty was resolved 
by having the decision of the powers ‘communicated’ to the Polish and 
German governments, while the official ‘notification’ was postponed until 
the convention had been concluded. […] The Upper Silesian or Geneva 
Convention of May 1922 […] created a special regime for the region for a 
period of fifteen years.99  
 
It was a hard task for the Great Powers to both weaken and satisfy Germany at the 
same time. For the Germans the loss of Upper Silesia was as outraging and insulting as 
the deprivation of the rights to Danzig and the corridor.  
 
2.12. Czechoslovakia 
With the beginning of World War I, anti-Habsburg sentiments among Czechs were 
common. In general, the Czechs publicly opposed war with the Slavic nations of Russia 
and Serbia. Both the civilian authorities from Vienna and military commanders in the 
Czech territories responded with tough repressions for the slightest disobedience, which 
alienated a vast part of the society and left a belief that Vienna should no longer master the 
Czech nation. 
U.S. President Woodrow Wilson’s tenth point stated that “the peoples of Austria-
Hungary, whose place among the nations we wish to see safeguarded and assured, should 
be accorded the freest opportunity to autonomous development.”100 This provided a new 
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hope for the liberation of Czechs although it was “far from a call for the dismemberment 
of the empire and the creation of an independent Czech or Czechoslovak state.”101  
On the Soviet question, Czechoslovakia was not a neighbor of Soviet Russia “and 
therefore had no territorial disagreements with it. Also, the ‘Bolshevik threat’ was not 
next door […] moreover, industrial Czechoslovakia was far more interested in 
establishing commercial relations with Soviet Russia than were agrarian [states].”102 With 
a long common border with Soviet Russia, agrarian Poland had the “Bolshevik threat 
next door” and, perhaps most importantly, long Russian domination influenced her very 
contrary conviction.  
The Polish-Ukrainian Kiev campaign produced in strong resentments from 
Czechoslovakia. In Czechoslovak literature it is still presented as a Polish invasion, but in 
fact, it was conducted with the Ukrainian army to liberate the Ukrainian capital from 
Bolshevik occupation. “In reality, Piłsudski’s attack on Kiev was no more an act of 
aggression against Soviet Russia than the Allied landings in Normandy in 1944 could be 
construed as an act of aggression against Nazi Germany.”103 The Polish-Czech relations 
were also overshadowed by the common and disputable borderlands. 
 
2.12.1 The Czechoslovakian Border with Poland 
Independent Czechoslovakia and Poland were reestablished in October and 
November 1918, respectively. On November 5, 1918, the rich industrial area of Cieszyn 
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(German: Teschen, Czech: Těšin) Silesia was divided along ethnic lines between Poland 
and Czechoslovakia.  
From the beginning there was some tension in the Czech attitude towards Poland. 
The bone of contention was Cieszyn Silesia (roughly 350 square miles), rich in coal mines 
and industry and containing a dense railroad network. Aside from the industrial advantages, 
the dispute also had ambitious overtones. In his memories the first President of the 
Czechoslovak Republic Thomas Masaryk wrote: 
 Now and again a voice from Poland is heard to proclaim that the Polish 
nation will be the leader of the Slav peoples since, next to Russia, it is the 
greatest among them, and possesses the needful groundwork of Western 
civilization. We must wait and see whether Poland can play this part. I 
myself doubt if she is sufficiently qualified for it. Others again […] have 
often extolled Prague as the capital of the Slav world. If they mean Prague 
as a centre of Slav culture, I may agree with them. Geographically, Prague 
is easily accessible to those of the Slavs who look westward. In culture, we 
possess the right foundation and might take the lead, especially as we have 
gone ahead of the other Slavs, thanks, chiefly, to our Reformation.104 
 
Such ambitions augmented by Czech economic considerations and the desire for 
territorial expansion, led to an invasion of the Polish part of Cieszyn Silesia and 
occupation of the city of Cieszyn. 
The role of President Masaryk in this event is unclear. To illustrate this vagueness 
two opinions can be quoted. “The Czechoslovak government, pressed by its military men, 
decided to secure Těšin by force and present the Peace Conference with a fait accompli. 
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President Masaryk had qualms about using force, but his objections were overruled”105 
says Victor S. Mamatey in the history of the Czechoslovak Republic. However the 
monograph about Antonín Švehla and the Czechoslovak Republican Party states: “at the 
cabinet meeting of 17 January 1919, Švehla [the Prime Minister] reported that the 
Czechoslovak army was ready to move into the Polish area. President Masaryk was 
present (a relatively rare occurrence) and stated [...]: ‘I agree with the occupation... if 
reports that there is complete anarchy there are true.’”106 
The report of the “complete anarchy” in Cieszyn Silesia was not true. On the 
contrary – Polish officials organized the election to the Polish Parliament, but this didn’t 
make a difference to the Czech’s side. “‘The occupation will give us coal and order,’ noted 
Švehla. [...] Let us wait until Dr. Kramař reaches Paris in order to cover our behinds.’”107 
On January 23, 1919, when Polish troops fought in Lvov,108 the Czechoslovak army 
entered the Polish part of the Cieszyn Silesia. 1,300 Poles could not immediately stop the 
15,000 well equipped and armed Czech troops. However, the battle of Skoczów (January 
28-30, 1919), the largest but last in this skirmish was a Polish victory. The Czechs asked 
for an armistice: “the Czechs, by all means, wanted to prevent the election to the Polish 
parliament on the territories controlled by Poland. The results would be, beyond all doubt, 
favorable for the Polish side and would sanction Polish rights to this region.”109  
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“Before the Peace conference brought both sides into negotiation agenda, the 
Czechs exploited Poland’s military engagement on other more vital borders and took the 
part of Těšin city occupied by the Poles by force. This left bitter resentment on the Polish 
side,”110 admit Czech historians although the word “occupied” used to describe the ethnic 
majority is questionable. 
The Czechoslovak government referred the matter to the Great Powers, having 
earlier tricked France into a political agreement which obliged it to support Czech territorial 
claims. Sporadic Polish-Czech military activities and international negotiations led to an 
agreement, signed February 1, 1919, by the United States, Great Britain, France, Italy, 
Poland, and Czechoslovakia, which was advantageous to the Czechs. However the Entente 
powers prompted the Czechs to negotiate with Poland.  
On May 17, 1919, during a conversation between members of the Council of Four, 
Woodrow Wilson stated:  
Yesterday I received a visit from MM. Kramář and Beneš, who 
came to talk to me about the question of Teschen. M. Beneš gave an 
excellent explanation and presented the arguments of the Czechoslovaks 
with great clarity and moderation. He remarks that the importance of 
Teschen for Bohemia comes, not only from its coal mines, but also from 
the fact that communication between Bohemia and Slovakia can only be 
assured by a line across this territory. Furthermore, the Teschen district is 
included within the historical borders of the Kingdom of Bohemia. The 
difficulty, from the Polish side, is that the question of Teschen is a party 
question, and it has become almost impossible for M. Paderewski to 
accept the compromise.111 
                                                 
110 Krejčí, Jaroslav and Pavel Machonin. Czechoslovakia, 1918-92: a laboratory for social change. 
St.Martin's Press, Oxford, St. Antony's College, New York 1996, p. 36. 
111 Link. The deliberations of the Council of Four, vol. II, p. 88. 
66 
 
An armed invasion backed by the above explanation followed. The Polish-Czech 
talks were held between July 21-29, 1919, but failed. While the Poles presented concrete 
and wide-ranging political and economic proposals, the Czechs were only intent on 
maintaining the appearance of negotiations and rejected all proposals.112 In the meantime 
the Czechoslovak government issued a statement condemning Piłsudski’s hazardous policy 
toward Soviet Russia and refusing any aid to Poland, whether it be direct or indirect, in her 
war with the Bolsheviks. 
 
2.12.2. Cancelled Plebiscites and Unsolved Problems 
On September 27, 1919, the Supreme Council decided to hold a plebiscite in 
Cieszyn Silesia. The next year in Spa the Polish delegation agreed to comply with the 
League of Nations’ verdict instead of the plebiscite. On July 28, 1920, the Conference of 
Ambassadors representing the Supreme Council awarded to Czechoslovakia the entire 
disputed territory, even though the area was predominantly Polish-speaking. “About 
184,000 Poles […] were thereby deprived of the right to Polish citizenship unless they 
opted for moving away from their homesteads.”113 The Czechoslovak government 
announced its neutrality in the Polish-Soviet conflict and starting at the end of May, 
Czech railroad workers blocked all military supplies for Poland.  
The creation of the northern border of the Slovakian part of Czechoslovakia also 
produced friction with Poland. The vast part of three Slovakian-speaking regions – Spish 
(Slovak: Spiš, Polish: Spisz), Orava, and Chadtse (Slovak: Čadce, Polish: Czadce) – was 
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awarded to Poland based on economic and political grounds. This was considered a 
defeat by the Slovaks. “In Orava, abandoning the plebiscite raised mass protests and 
accusations that the Czech government in Prague and Minister Beneš traded Orava for 
Cieszyn Silesia.”114 
The Polish officials regarded the Supreme Council’s decision as a dictate 
negatively affecting vital Polish interests. Polish authorities did everything to revise the 
existing resolution, while the military liberation of the annexed areas was out of the 
question. “The unfavorable atmosphere [...] was compounded by the anti-Polish policy of 
the Czech authorities in the annexed areas.”115 
These events resulted in poor relations between Poland and Czechoslovakia 
during the following years. 
 
2.13. Southern border: Romania 
Southeast Poland (Polish: Pokucie), bordered with Romania in the sub-Carpathian 
region along the upper Pruth and Czeremosz rivers, came, at first, under Romanian 
domination and during middle 1919, was occupied by the Romanian army. Thanks to 
military cooperation of the Romanian and Polish armies, motivated by a desire to minimize 
the communist threat from Soviet Russia, diplomatic relations between the two countries 
were established in June 1919 and a settlement was reached. Romania handed the territory 
to Poland and the border was established along a historical line in the Bukovina region. 
This was a rare example of constructive politics in post-World War I Europe.  
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3. Conclusions 
 
3.1 International Recognition 
In 1918, the newborn Poland was confronted with tremendous difficulties. The 
country suffered greatly during the Great War. The material losses were astronomical 
(some sources estimated them at $2 billion gold). Poland received no reparations and had 
to pay part of Austria’s debts. The country was already economically backward; there 
was no common law, currency or financial resources. The state was divided ethnically, 
religiously and linguistically – one third of the population consisted of minorities. 
Piłsudski’s idea of a federation proved unattainable. Despite overwhelming difficulties, 
the fight for freedom consolidated the Polish nation, increased the feeling of national 
identity, and mobilized the people to seemingly impossible efforts, as in the battles of 
Warsaw.116 
From 1918 the eastern Polish border was constantly in fire. A civil war raged in 
Russia. The retreat of the Central Powers armies from the Mitteleuropa at the end of 
1918, left political vacuum. With Poland also Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, Belarus and 
Ukraine emerged as independent states and they did not have any borders either.  
The detachment of the former provinces of the Russian Empire and their possible 
independence met Moscow's violent reaction. In 1919, the Bolsheviks consecutively 
invaded the Ukraine, Belarus, Lithuania and Poland. After two years of the exhausting 
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warfare the Bolsheviks got their prey: Belarus and Ukraine were taken over by Soviet 
Russia and became Soviet Socialist Republics.117 
As soon as Poland’s boundaries were recognized by the Conference of 
Ambassadors on March 15, 1923, the country managed its internal matters. Other 
achievements followed: one of the most spectacular examples was the rapid 
transformation of the small village Gdynia118 into the most modern Baltic port at that 
time. The existence of this modern and efficient port signified Poland’s new advantage of 
an outlet to the sea. It also raised the nation’s self-confidence. 
 
3.2 Instant Consequences and Results 
Despite the eventual international recognition, Polish borders presented problems 
until the outbreak of World War II when by German and Soviet forces united to destroy 
Poland. For nearly twenty years Poland experienced open hostility from all bordering 
states except Romania. The geographical position of Poland between two European 
superpowers, Germany and Russia, was extremely dangerous, except when both states 
were weak. Germany never agreed to its eastern territorial losses, and it could be 
expected that sooner or later she would reclaim them. Clemenceau was right when he told 
Woodrow Wilson: “Do not believe they will ever forgive us; they only seek opportunity 
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for revenge. Nothing will extinguish the rage of those who wanted to establish their 
domination over the world and who believed themselves so close to succeeding.”119 
On the other hand Soviet Russia described the Treaty of Riga and the Polish-
Soviet War as a “temporary” and “tactical move.” After the war, the Soviet – and more 
recently Russian – approach has been unambiguous: anything opposing Russia’s needs, 
desires and demands was considered negative. Thus the opinion of the contemporary 
Russian historian Manusevich is not surprising when he quotes “the Polish bourgeois 
politician” Dmowski’s opinion – taken out of context – that the Polish people could not 
regain independence alone and needed powerful assistance. He concluded that “such aid, 
even against Dmowski’s opinion, was provided to the Polish nation by the Soviet State, 
against which the revived Poland immediately began armed combat.”120 Subsequently, 
Manusevich argued how the “ungrateful Poland” regularly rejected benefits offered by 
the Soviets in the 1920s.121 
Animosity between Poland and Czechoslovakia over the Cieszyn Silesia issue 
increased. In Poland it became a national obsession, almost hysteria, with terrible results. 
Immediately following the September 1938Munich agreement, Polish troops entered 
Cieszyn Silesia after Poland demanded and obtained agreement for this occupation from 
the Czechs. “At that time it was Czechoslovakia that could not defend herself because 
other much more important issues were at stake. […] It was, however, a short lived 
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success for the Poles. Overrun by the German army one year later, the Polish state ceased 
to exist only half a year later after the demise of Czechoslovakia. Germany took 
everything.”122  
Lithuania remained indignant about the Central Lithuania and Vilna issue, 
remaining formally at war with Poland until 1938. In Poland, the National Democrats 
triumphed in foreign and domestic policy of tough nationalism and denunciation of equal 
rights for ethnic minorities. To oppose the idea of a Polish federation they deliberately 
left several important cities (Mińsk, Kamieniec Podolski, Berdyczów) within Soviet 
hands, then surrounding territories and hundreds of thousands of Polish citizens (deported 
later by the Soviets to its Asiatic provinces). It has been argued, that with Polish borders 
stretched far to the east, was done because, with Polish borders stretching so far east, the 
party would never have won the election. This policy affected minority relations.  
Belarusian activists regarded the Riga settlement as treason and 
tragedy. Although other blows would follow, after Riga it was hard to see 
Warsaw as an ally of Belarusian aspirations. […] Polish policy remained 
repressive throughout the 1920s and 1930s [and] never allowed for the 
creation of a Belarusian national society. Stalin’s Soviet Union, on the 
other hand, destroyed during the 1930s the Soviet Belarusian society that 
had arisen in the 1920s.123 
 
The Ukraine never gave up its aspirations for independence. To Ukrainians the 
Riga Peace Treaty legalized the partition of their lands between Poland and Soviet 
Russia. This resentment and open hostility toward Poland manifested itself during World 
War II: among four nations fighting on the Ukrainian lands, Germans, Russians and 
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Ukrainians agreed in one issue: annihilation of Polish ethnic groups, resulting in 
genocide. The Ukraine denies responsibility for the slaughter of Polish inhabitants in the 
former Galicia during World War II, but remembers the battle of Lvov, the Ukrainian 
campaign of 1919, and the partition signed in Riga. Accusation about the Ribbentrop-
Molotov Pact, the Katyn forest massacre and Stalin’s terror, are answered by questions 
about the number of Russian POWs who perished after the Polish-Soviet war.  
The problem of defining the borders of a country such as Poland involved many 
issues, but almost always the peace of a region is at stake. The lack of internationally 
recognized borders is the primary basis for the hypothesis that in Poland World War I 
ended in 1923. As demonstrated, in Poland this was a very sensitive problem for many 
years. 
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